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REMEDYING THE MISUSE OF NATURE
Sanne H. Knudsen
INTRODUCTION
Like other life forms, humans depend upon nature for their survival-for
food, water, clothing, shelter, and the like. Necessarily, we alter nature
considerably as we go about meeting these needs. Some of these alterations are
unobjectionable, or even good. Other alterations are not so good; they entail
misuses of nature. When nature is misused, environmental problems are created.
Air and water get polluted; soil erodes; dead zones spread; species disappear;
exotics become pests. Though it is no easy task to distinguish between uses and
misuses of nature, the wisdom of curtailing such misuses is clear.
A century ago, we mostly viewed nature as a source of discrete natural
resources.' We then misused nature when we dirtied our homes and diminished the
flows of minerals, plants, and animals through wasteful consumption.2 Today we
understand nature much differently-we realize that landscapes are complex,
functioning wholes.3 We know, or ought to know, that our long-term flourishing
depends, not just on specific, valuable parts of nature, but on the ability of these
0 © 2012 Sanne H. Knudsen. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington
School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Eric Freyfogle for his invaluable comments and
discussions on earlier drafts of this work.
' CURT MEINE, CORRECTION LINES: ESSAYS ON LAND, LEOPOLD, AND CONSERVATION
48 (2004) ("Conservation in the Progressive Era rested, first and foremost, on utilitarian
and anthropocentric premises. 'The first principle of conservation is development, the use
of the natural resources now existing on this continent for the benefit of the people who
live here now."') (quoting GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 43 (1910));
see also DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: THE ROOTS OF ECOLOGY 268 (1977)
("In the history of progressive agriculture, wild creatures had never counted for much.
They failed to conform to the farmer's productive purposes and so were seen as useless
when not seen as a threat.").
2 See Dave Foreman, The New Conservation Movement, in DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE OF THE NEW
ENVIRONMENTALISM 50-56 (George Sessions ed., 1995) (explaining how the work of early
conservation biologists exposed the harm that resource extraction causes ecosystems).
See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem
Management, 65 U. COLo. L. REV. 293, 294-95 (1994) (noting that land managers
"[r]ecogniz[e] that natural systems often cross jurisdictional boundaries" and that
lawmakers are "beginning to speak in ecosystem terms"). As an example of the
interconnectedness of ecosystems, consider that the Inuits inhabiting remote arctic areas
have "among the highest PCB levels in their blood of any community on earth." JAMES
RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY
3 (2d ed. 2009).
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landscapes to maintain their ecological functioning. We have also adopted widely
held beliefs that certain parts of nature-rare species, for instance-can have value
and deserve protection without regard for known human benefits.5
While our appreciation for what constitutes a misuse of nature has evolved
with the study of ecology, our environmental laws have not. The multitude of
environmental laws, although important in their own right, do not protect nature as
an interconnected whole. Rather, environmental laws dissect ecosystems into
discrete elements-air, water, timber, and wildlife, for example.6 This dissection
ignores the invaluable services that ecosystems provide when allowed to function
without undue disruption.
Shortcomings in current laws are particularly acute in the case of lands and
resources that are privately owned. There is a widespread belief that private
owners have discretion to act as they see fit so long as they avoid overtly harming
neighbors. Laws tell landowners to restrain their alterations of nature in only a
few settings. As a result, nature on private lands is shaped by decisions and values
held by individual landowners, despite the public interests at stake.
Often the problem of protecting ecosystems is made even more complicated
by the belief that we should be able to devise a solution by tweaking existing tools
and operating within an inherited worldview. 9 But what if the solution lies in
another frame entirely? Imagine an unencumbered opportunity to align ecological
understanding, private interests, public needs, and the law. How might we
approach the problem then? In particular, if we were to devise a reformed law for
curtailing and remedying misuses of nature on private and public lands, what
might that law look like? How might it protect ecosystem services like water
4 See, e.g., JAMES LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH 9 (1979)
("[T]he entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to
algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living entity .... ); see also infra Part .B
(discussing ecosystem services and the public's interest in private land).
5 See, e.g., Arne Naess, The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects,
in DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY AND
PRACTICE OF THE NEW ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 2, at 64, 64-84 (explaining that
the Deep Ecology Movement is based on the view that nature is valuable for its own sake,
and not merely for human interests).
6 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (2006); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2006);
Endangered Species Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599 (2006).
7 Joseph L. Sax, Ownership, Property, and Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
15 (2011); see also ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON
GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 6-9, 20-24 (2007) (discussing the "partial truths"
that pervade American thought and property law, such as the right of landowners to
exclude all others, the protection of liberty through the protection of property rights, and
the absolute nature of private property rights).
8 For example, the Clean Water Act prohibits the alteration of wetlands without a
permit, even when the wetlands happen to fall on private lands. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
9 See discussion infra Part II.C.
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filtration, carbon sequestration, and soil nitrification? How would the law function
given that nature is an interconnected whole that knows no boundary between
public and private lands? Would it freely acknowledge the public's interest in
preserving valuable ecosystem services, even those that happen to fall on private
lands? How might a reformed law work with existing federal and state natural
resource laws?
A property law that restrained land misuse would go beyond protecting the
interests of individual owners. It would respect broader public interests in how
nature is altered. It would recognize how one piece of nature is ecologically
intertwined with other pieces of nature, near and far, and how uses of one may
affect others. It would consider how people living in a landscape depend upon the
healthy functioning of the entire landscape. And it would take seriously, and
somehow protect, the interests of other life forms and future generations.
A legal system that embraced the goal of using nature responsibly would
require more than just new substantive rules on how people could use nature. It
would also require a widely applicable legal remedy-a statutory cause of action-
that citizens could use to stop misuses of nature and otherwise gain relief. Given
the limitations of the common law,10 a more explicit and broad-based approach is
needed in order to remedy harms to ecosystems. Some scholars have recognized
this need," and many have lamented the difficulties inherent in attempting to mend
a broken view of private property.12 None, however, have suggested the approach
proposed in this Article-a rethinking and expansion of natural resource damages
law.13
10 See infra Part II.C.
" See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Improving Laws, Declining World: The Tort of
Contamination, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1249, 1259 (2004) (proposing the creation of a new
tort of contamination "defined as interference with the use and enjoyment of ecosystem
functions"); David S. Wilgus, The Nature of Nuisance: Judicial Environmental Ethics and
Landowner Stewardship in the Age of Ecology, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 99,,107 (2001)
("The reality that we do not live on a boundless continent, coupled with an increasingly
sophisticated understanding of our affects on the natural environment, should cause us to
broaden our notions of property and infuse modem property law with an environmental
ethic.").
12 See, e.g., ERIc T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON GOOD 7 (2003) ("Much of today's conflict about property rights has arisen
precisely because land is so different in law and nature."); see also Robert J. Goldstein,
Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real
Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 352-53 (1998) (arguing that courts
should recognize "green wood" in the bundle of sticks that make up property rights as a
means of balancing private property rights and environmental ethics); Wilgus, supra note
11, at 102 ("[O]utmoded notions of property law prevent a harmonization of ecology and
law.").
13 Although very few scholars have discussed the potential for natural resource
damages to serve a broader role in remedying harms to nature, Professor Peter M. Manus
remarked over a decade ago that natural resource damages law "has direct and real
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As currently conceived, natural resource damages are limited in scope; even
in combination they cannot adequately remedy misuses of nature. Even so, these
damages pr6vide a good starting point for assessing the promise and flaws
embodied in existing laws. By identifying the limits of current resource-related
remedies, the changes required to better protect ecosystem health become clearer.
In search of a reformed natural resource damages law, Part I of this Article
begins by exploring the idea that we should not misuse nature. It surveys current
literature and explains how the idea would-if taken seriously-recast the ways
we think about private property. Part II sets the stage for a reformulated law of
natural resource damages by noting the gaps and limits of key environmental
statutes and of the common law of property. It focuses particularly on the law's
failure to respect ecological functioning and the public's interest in private land.
Part III surveys the law of natural resource damages, which provides useful
elements for constructing a broader, more ecologically grounded remedy. Part IV
draws together the Article's various parts to outline an expanded remedy for
misuses of nature. The assessment is necessarily broad brushed. Its contribution is
not in proposing detailed answers but in getting the challenges on the table. Part IV
considers eight such challenges, each of which is foundational to the problem of
protecting the healthy functioning of ecosystems when those systems know no
boundary between federal, state, tribal, and private lands.
I. THE MISUSE OF NATURE-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
The very suggestion that we provide remedies for the misuse of nature
assumes that we can decide which human alterations of nature qualify as misuse.
That task, however, is not so easy.
How do extractive and destructive land uses-for example, mining-fair
when we delineate between use and misuse? Is a piece of land misused simply
because it is destroyed? Or, is land only misused when the benefits derived from
its degradation do not outweigh the benefit derived from leaving the ecosystem
more intact? On what basis do we decide whether one set of benefits outweighs
another? Who receives the benefits and for what reason? To what will we turn for
guidance in determining where to draw the line between use and misuse-science,
economics, or ethics? Will we rely on some combination of idealism and
pragmatism?
Even though science can provide objective information about the character,
extent, and consequences of land use, some ethical framework is needed to decide
potential to translate into financial liabilities the long-term, broad ranging, and aesthetic
effects of human activities on nature." Peter M. Manus, Natural Resource Damages from
Rachel Carson's Perspective: A Rite of Spring in American Environmentalism, 37 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 381, 388 (1996); see also id at 421 ("Perhaps more than any other
enviromnental law concept, [natural resource damages] has the potential to represent
progress toward a legal structure that incorporates [Rachel] Carson's philosophy.").
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what changes are wise or foolish, moral or immoral. In search of such a
framework, the widespread tendency of some observers is to evaluate a human-
altered landscape by comparing it with what the landscape would have looked like
without any human-caused change.14 This is the wilderness ideal, and it implies
that all human change is bad and that less change is better. This normative standard
may have value in some settings-in landscapes that we want to preserve or
restore to wilderness-like conditions-but it makes no sense when applied to
landscapes that humans inhabit to meet their needs. All species change their
environments as they go about living.15 Humans are not, and need not be, different.
Once we discard this wilderness ideal as the baseline for good land use, we
are cast adrift-we must come up with some other standard for distinguishing
between legitimate uses of nature and abuses of nature. The subject has drawn the
attention of various commentators, and their work provides a starting point. For
now, let us set aside the question of how to distinguish between use and misuse of
nature. Let us work first to achieve consensus on the point that it is necessary and
proper to do so.
A. Avoiding the Misuse ofNature
As people living in a community, we have a collective responsibility to avoid
the misuse of nature. This obligation must be accepted before the problem of
ecosystem conservation can even begin to be solved; without a shared ethical basis
for accepting limits on the use of nature, we will never be comfortable with the
sacrifices of economics or convenience that such limits will inevitably require.
Support for our shared obligation to avoid the misuse of nature is found in
literature, religion, culture, science, and law. In particular, there is a rich literature
of scholars contemplating the roots and extent of our ethical obligations to serve as
stewards of nature, rather than merely consumers of it. The best-known and
perhaps most influential call for an environmental ethic (a land ethic, as he termed
it) has come from Aldo Leopold (1887-1948). In much-quoted language, Leopold
14 For a general introduction to the large body of literature on the wilderness ideal, see
THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998)
(a collection of previously published works that approach the concept of wilderness in a
variety of ways); THE WILDERNESS DEBATE RAGES ON: CONTINUING THE GREAT NEW
WILDERNESS DEBATE (Michael P. Nelson & J. Baird Callicott eds., 2008) (a collection of
works contributing to the wilderness conversation). One much-cited essay in the debate is
William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, in
UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69, 69-90 (William
Cronon ed., 1995) (discussing the wilderness ideal and arguing that the time is ripe to look
beyond it).
1s See Carolyn M. Malmstrom, Ecologists Study the Interactions of Organisms and
Their Environment, 1 NATURE EDUC. KNOWLEDGE, no. 8, 2010 at 9, available at
http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/ecologists-study-the-interactions-of-
organisms-and-13235586.
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summed up the substance of his proposed land ethic with this deceivingly poetic
measure: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."' 6 In other
writings, Leopold emphasized the place of humans as citizens within a larger land
community; he urged us to recognize the importance of land health. In doing so,
Leopold argued for treating nature as an interconnected whole so that it retains its
capacity for self-renewal:
[T]he health of the land as a whole, rather than the supply of its
constituent 'resources,' is what needs conserving. Land, like other things,
has the capacity for self-renewal (i.e. for permanent productivity) only
when its natural parts are present, and functional. It is a dangerous
fallacy to assume that we are free to discard or change any part of the
land we do not find 'useful' (such as flood plains, marshes, and wild
floras and faunas). Too violent modification of the natural order has
repeatedly disorganized the land's capacity for self-renewal.17
The responsibility for maintaining land health, Leopold argued, is a shared
responsibility, a collective duty of stewardship: "A land ethic, then, reflects the
existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of
individual responsibility for the health of the land."' 8 Leopold's words resonate in
the quest to protect ecosystem services and use nature in a way that preserves
nature's functions.
Modem day scholars, most notably Professor Eric Freyfogle, have echoed
Leopold's call to root conservation in the stewardship of land and a concern for
community interests.' 9 Freyfogle artfully sums up Leopold's work by explaining
16 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
224-25 (spec. commemorative ed. 1989). For an excellent summation and explanation of
the context of Leopold's work, see ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WHY CONSERVATION IS FAILING
AND How IT CAN REGAIN GROUND 18-27 (2006).
17 FREYFOGLE, supra note 16, at 22 (citing.Aldo Leopold, Conservation (Aug. 8,
1946) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Wisconsin Digital
Collections) (attached to Letter from Horace S. Fries to Aldo Leopold (Aug. 8, 1946) (on
file with the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections), available at
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/AldoLeopold/AldoLeopold-idx?type=goto&id=Aldo
Leopold.ALCorresAK&isize=M&submit-Go+to+page&page=5 10)).
1 LEOPOLD, supra note 16, at 221.
19 Leopold is the touchstone for legal scholars who argue in support of an
environmental ethic focused on land stewardship. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold,
The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
281, 281 (2002) (using Leopold to begin the article's discussion questioning the modern
metaphor that describes property as a bundle of sticks); FREYFOGLE, supra note 16, at 18
("Leopold has hardly been conservation's only major intellect, but he remains the dominant
one, long after his death in 1948."); Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental
Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 77 (2003) (beginning the discussion of environmental
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that "conservation for Leopold focused on the totality of nature as an
interconnected whole and on the need to counteract the chief forces-market
economics and private property above all-that fueled harmful land-use
choices."20 Picking up Leopold's call to critically analyze private property,
Freyfogle has written extensively on property law and our mistaken perception that
private land use is without limits. 21 By placing modem views on private property
in a historical context, Freyfogle argues in favor of a conservation ethic that is
rooted in community and supported by a public rights perspective of property
law.22 Property law, Freyfogle explains, is
full of legal arrangements that recognize ownership in one party and use
rights in another. It would be a significant step, but hardly
unprecedented, for lawmakers to declare that the public owns all of
nature, with private owners holding something akin to use rights, tailored
23to respect the common good.
Professor Joseph Sax has similarly emphasized the necessity of respecting and
incorporating ethical obligations into the evolution of environmental laws. In his
well-known 1970 article, Sax recognized moral and ethical limits on the ownership
of nature when he argued that the public trust doctrine 24 is a viable tool for
ethical frameworks with the "formative writings" of Leopold); Goldstein, supra note 12, at
391-92 (explaining that the concept of stewardship has been developed from Leopold's
writings and land ethic).
20 FREYFOGLE, supra note 16, at 19.
21 See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 58-63 (discussing liberty and government
regulation); FREYFOGLE, supra note 7 (discussing the rights of landowners, how these
rights change overtime, and how these rights intertwine with other rights); Eric T.
Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (2010) (discussing how
private property and liberty are intertwined, and what liberties should be secured in the
realm of private property); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 574 (1999) [hereinafter Freyfogle, Particulars of Owning] (discussing private
property, popular will, and public policy).
22 FREYFOGLE, supra note 16, at 17.
23 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 239.
24 In its traditional formulation, the public trust doctrine provides that states hold title
to certain lands (submerged lands) in trust for the benefit of citizens of the state. See ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458-60 (1892); Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989). Because certain resources are held in trust, their
disposition and use must be consistent with public trust responsibilities of the state. See,
e.g., Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) ("[I]t has been long
established that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands
held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.").
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protecting certain "gifts of nature" from privatization or exploitation.25 Sax has
also argued for a property system based on a usufructary model, wherein the owner
of the usufruct only has a "right to uses compatible with the community's
dependence on the property as a resource."26 Because public resources fall on
private lands, Sax more recently urged that that we need to do some
"fundamentally fresh thinking" about what it means to be a landowner27 and that
"the public has a legitimate stake in the way in which owners use land."28
In their writings, Sax and Freyfogle both echo Leopold's theme of humans
'being part of a land community. They urge the subordination of private land use to
community interests where appropriate, as one might expect from a stewardship-
based ethic. Inherent in stewardship, of course, is the assumption that the stewards
will not misuse the nature entrusted to their care. In this sense, a stewardship-based
ethic has strong roots in cultural and religious doctrines.29
Christianity is a good example of a dominant western religion with roots in
values of stewardship. In the Christian tradition, God is the creator of Earth and
has entrusted humans with the responsibility of caring for His creation.3 0 Many
scholars have argued that this relationship between God, humans, and creation
gives rise to a stewardship model in which humans must actively work to manage
God's creation. Professor John Copeland Nagle has meaningfully contributed to
25 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 484 (1970); Peter Manus, To a Candidate in
Search of an Environmental Theme: Promote the Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315,
330-33 (2000).
26 Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1452 (1993).
27 Joseph L. Sax, Lecture at the Fifteenth Annual Symposium of the Wallace Stegner
Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment: Ownership, Property, and Sustainability
(Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Joseph L. Sax Lecture]; see also Joseph L. Sax, Ownership,
Property, and Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (2011).
28 Joseph L. Sax Lecture, supra note 27, at 10.
29 For a detailed discussion on how attitudes towards private property changed during
the Industrial Revolution and how individual rather than community interests began to
dominate, see FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 65 ("Industrialism was coming, and by the
time it had fully made its mark late in the century, landowners would hold a bundle of
rights far different from the one they held when the century began."); also see Joseph L.
Sax Lecture, supra note 27.
30 Genesis 1:26-28. While Genesis provides that God entrusted man with "dominion"
over the Earth, and while some have grabbed this passage as giving man license to
dominate nature, religious scholars have explained that "dominion" is used elsewhere in
the scriptures to "refer to a peaceful rule designed to serve those living subject to it." JOHN
COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 44 (2002).
31 See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to
Ecological Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787, 804-08
(2008) (providing an excellent discussion of literature focused on Christian ideas of
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this area and noted that "Christian ideas of stewardship build upon the twenty-six
references to 'steward' or 'stewardship' that are contained in the Bible."32
Nonchristian cultures have similarly deep traditions that teach respect for
nature. For example, in the Native American culture, man is considered "one with
nature," giving rise to a relationship in which man is a steward rather than
conqueror or owner:
The Indians saw themselves as one with nature. All of their traditions
agree on this. Nature is the larger whole of which mankind is only a part.
People stand within the natural world, not separate from it; and are
dependent on it, not dominant over it. All living things are one, and the
people are joined with trees, predators and prey, rocks and rain in a vast,
powerful, interrelationship. . . . Because of this deep kinship, Indians
accorded to every form of life the right to live, perpetuate its species, and
follow the way of its own being as a conscious fellow creature. Animals
were treated with the same consideration and respect as human beings.3 3
The respect that Native American and other subsistence cultures have for natural
systems has been deemed an important "precursor to a land ethic." 34
Buddhism is yet another example of religion echoing a common theme of
stewardship. The most important principle of "Buddhist karma-based ethics is
ahinsa, the principles of non-harming and of respect for life."35 To that end,
Buddhist monks take vows to follow moral perceptions that prohibit harming the
environment; "[t]here are vows for protecting the purity of the water; for not
killing sentient beings who live in the earth; for not killing insects, birds, and
animals; for not starting forest fires; and for respecting the life of trees, particularly
ancient ones."3 6
stewardship). Notably, Bruce Babbitt spoke of the stewardship responsibility that is rooted
in Christian tradition when he argued that religious values as well as our responsibility as
stewards remain at the heart of the Endangered Species Act. Bruce Babbitt, Between the
Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant to Protect the Whole of Creation, 2 ANIMAL L. 1
(1996), as reprinted in THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra
note 30, at 39, 39-43.
32 Nagle, supra note 31, at 804; see also John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82
MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1226-33 (1998) (discussing the Christian idea of stewardship in the
environmental context).
33 NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 30, at 46 (quoting J. DONALD HUGHES, AMERICAN
INDIAN ECOLOGY 14-17 (1983)).
34 Goldstein, supra note 12, at 388.
3 Ron Epstein, Environmental Issues: A Buddhist Perspective, VAJRA BODHI SEA,
Mar. 2005, at 28, 30 (Winnie Tiu & Gwo Tseng Wei trans.), available at http://online.sfsu.
edu/~rone/Buddhism/EnvironBudPersp.pdf.
36 id.
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In addition to religious traditions, the notion that we ought not misuse nature
finds support in our willingness to protect the environment through statutes and the
common law.3 7 In other words, we would not have bothered ourselves with such a
complex and comprehensive web of environmental statutes unless we recognized
that unfettered pollution of rivers or destruction of habitat is unsustainable and
unacceptable. 38 This is not to say that the values motivating our various
environmental laws form a cohesive or articulated ethic.39 But despite common
quibbles over what level of pollution control or land use regulation is acceptable,
our willingness to accept an impressive amount of environmental regulation
reflects a common understanding that some limits on industrial society and land
use are necessary to preserve a healthy civilization.40
Various common law doctrines also reflect a desire to limit the use of nature
when that use crosses certain thresholds. For example, the natural use doctrine
provides that "[a]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others."A1 Similarly, by
protecting private property owners from unreasonable interference by other
owners, the nuisance doctrine recognizes that private lands do not exist in isolation
and that certain limits are appropriate whei land use adversely impacts others. For
resources protected under the public trust doctrine, limits on private property use
are also appropriate to promote broader public interests. The inherent limits on
land use recognized by these common law doctrines support the normative claim
that we ought not misuse nature, whether to protect state's rights, the rights of
other landowners, or the public trust.
Beyond law and religion, the claim that we ought not misuse nature finds
support in science itself. The science of ecology educates us on the indispensable
3 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck,
17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 75-79 (2008) (referencing the tens of thousands of regulatory
mandates embodied in our environmental laws).
38 See Goldstein, supra note 12, at 395-96.
3 Flournoy, supra note 19, at 66 (arguing "it is not clear that environmental laws do
reflect any clearly articulated ethic that should be called environmental" and suggesting
"[a]s a nation, we lack an adequate understanding of the values that undergird these laws").
40 Goldstein, supra note 12, at 395 ("The whole body of environmental laws that have
been enacted over the course of the past forty years are a testament to that policy and to the
willingness of society to exact economic costs for the sake of that policy.... [These laws]
demonstrate the movement of society toward the understanding that preservation and
protection of our natural environment is a positive value, and a widespread one.").
41 Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); see FREYFOGLE, supra
note 12, at 94-97 (explaining and quoting Just, 201 N.W.2d at 767-68); see also Arnold,
supra note 19, at 350-51 (discussing natural use doctrine). Several states, including
Wisconsin, Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Carolina, have adopted the
natural use doctrine. Id. at 350 n.344.
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value of ecosystems to human survival. 4 2 "[I]t is no exaggeration to state that the
suite of 'ecosystem services'-purifying air and water, detoxifying and
decomposing waste, renewing soil fertility, regulating climate, mitigating droughts
and floods, controlling pests, and pollinating vegetation-quite literally underpins
human society." 3 The importance of these services lends urgency to the call for a
land ethic grounded in stewardship rather than unbridled consumption. Science has
been a strong voice in this regard; Professor Robert J. Goldstein posits that "[t]he
science of ecology has been the most significant factor in the development of
environmental ethics over the course of the last century.""
Science, religion, culture, and law all offer arguments against misuse of
nature. The more difficult question, and the one that will undoubtedly evoke more
debate, is where to draw the line between use and misuse. Tackling this
uncomfortable and unclear question is inevitable given that people and nature are
intertwined. We cannot set aside natural resources in their entirety. We depend on
their use for our survival-yet human actions have consequences. Whether we
want to be or not, we are stewards of the natural world. The question is whether we
are good stewards or poor stewards. And this is how we come to the ultimate
question of which consequences are acceptable and which are not.45
Consider the role of science. In setting limits for environmental protection and
public health, we often turn to science for answers. For example, we turn to
science on issues like whether to ban leaded gasoline because of public health
impacts of lead exposure, 46 whether the habitat of a given species is so depleted or
fragmented so as to make that species in danger of extinction,4 or whether to
implement aggressive legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an effort
to curb climate change.4 8 Likewise, science arises in debates over what protections
42 See infra Part I.B.
43 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem
Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 157 (2007).
44 Goldstein, supra note 12, at 387.
45 Freyfogle explains that the conservation movement needs to adopt a vision of good
land use "in such a way that human needs are taken seriously and satisfied insofar as
possible, not shunted to the side for others to worry about." See FREYFOGLE, supra note 16,
at 176.
46 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEIZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 3-5 (2004) (summarizing the debate about
banning leaded gasoline and the role that science played in shaping that debate).
47 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed.
Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 17) (relying on "best available
scientific data" to determine whether sea ice habitat decline in the Artic regions warrants
protecting polar bears under the Endangered Species Act).
48 Through the Department of Commerce Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, Congress mandated that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), together with the National Academy of Sciences, to establish a
committee and produce a series of studies to ensure that climate decisions are informed by
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ought to be afforded to ecosystem functions.49 Indeed, the science of ecology has
been a catalyst for contemplating how environmental regulation, common law
doctrines, and property law theories need to adapt to new knowledge about the
interconnectedness and indispensable value of natural systems.50
Science can predict the likely consequences of our actions, telling us whether
they are reversible or irreversible, localized or widespread.5 ' But science does not
provide complete answers. As Professor Freyfogle has explained, part of the
problem is that science does not, and cannot, provide all the answers because
science is descriptive in nature-it tells us what nature does and what
consequences of our actions might be, but does not tell us what is right or wrong in
terms of degree of acceptable impacts to land.52 Nor does it tell us what risk levels
we should be willing to accept to promote public health. For example, on the issue
of endangered species protection, science could tell us that the proposed site of the
Tellico dam in the 1970s would have destroyed the only remaining snail darter
habitat.13 Science could not tell us whether this little fish and the associated
ecological benefits were worth the economic loss of destroying a nearly completed
dam that would produce 200 million kilowatt hours of hydroelectric power and
save an estimated 15 million gallons of oil in the midst of a national energy
crisis.54
Similarly, science plays a central role in the discussion of climate change.55
But global climate systems are complex, and there are many questions still
unanswered on this issue. For instance, what will be the consequences of climate
change in Utah, Florida, or India? Science cannot necessarily answer these
questions with certainty at this time, and there are other questions that science
the best possible scientific knowledge. The final report, COMM. ON AMERICA'S CLIMATE
CHOICES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AMERICA'S CLIMATE CHOICES (2011), available
at http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Americas-Climate-Choices/12781, was released in May 2011.
49 For example, the state of Washington has passed a Growth Management Act that
requires local governments to use the best available science when reviewing and revising
their policies and regulations on wetlands. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.010-70A.904
(2011). The state's Department of Ecology received funding from the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency to synthesize the science on wetlands in support of its mandate to local
governments. See Wetlands: Nature's Sponges, Nurseries, and Water Filters, WASH. ST.
DEP'T ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/sea/wetlands/index.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2012).
50 See infra note 197 and accompanying text for a brief survey of the scholarship
aimed at aligning environment laws with ecological understanding.
s' See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for examples of ways in which
science is used as a tool in decision-making.
52 FREYFOGLE, supra note 16, at 159.
53 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 153 (1978).
54 125 CONG. REC. 23,867 (1979) (statement of Sen. Howard Baker); see Stephen J,
Rechicar & Michael R. Fitzgerald, Administrative Decision and Economic Development:
TVA 's Tellico Dam Controversy, 8 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 223, 235 (1984).
5 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEIZERLING, supra note 46.
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cannot answer at all, like how many species are we willing to put at risk through
habitat loss? How much land are we prepared to lose along our coasts as a result of
the rising sea levels predicted to accompany climate change? Similarly, how many
communities in developing island nations are we willing to expose to flooding?
These last questions turn on our willingness to accept certain risk levels, which are
fundamental issues of policy or values, not science. 6 Ultimately, our line drawing
will be a blend of ethics and science.
Like the role that it has played in many issues before, science will
undoubtedly play a central role in distinguishing between use and misuse of nature.
Science will help decide when ordinary, expected, and necessary uses of nature
cross the line into misuses that ought to be limited for the greater benefit of
society. Science cannot, however, provide the wholesale answer. Some measure of
ethics and values will have to be considered.
B. The Public's Interest in Private Land
If we are to remedy the misuse of nature, we need more than an ethical
framework guiding our actions; we need to be specific about the scope of lands for
which we are prepared to accept responsibility. In particular, this means that any
enduring remedial framework must address lands in private ownership. 8 Over
sixty percent of lands in the United States are privately owned. 59 These lands are
not neatly separated from public lands, but instead form a pattern of land
ownership that resembles something of a patchwork quilt.60 Constructing a
framework to remedy the misuse of nature that ignores limits on private land use
would fail the most basic challenge of respecting land as an interconnected whole.
56 Professor Freyfogle has grappled with many of these issues. See FREYFOGLE, supra
note 16, at 152-59 (suggesting some normative benchmarks for determining what is good
land use. Prominent among those benchmarks are human utility, broadly defined; and
ethical obligations for future generations).
5 See Flournoy, supra note 19, at 80-88 (describing the various ethical frameworks
that drive the environmental philosophical debate, ranging from anthropocentric utilitarian
to biocentric communitarian).
FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 16 ("Leading American conservationists have
repeatedly offered a stern warning: because private land is so extensive, we are unlikely to
achieve conservation goals or halt the processes of degradation unless the country revises
(yet again, as we shall see) what it means to own nature.").
59 Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences
of Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REv. 301, 301 (2008).
60 For a case study example of how the comingling of public and private lands
challenges land conservation goals, see John D. Erickson & Sabine U O'Hara, From Top-
Down to Participatory Planning: Conservation Lessons from the Adirondack Park, United
States, in BIODIVERSITY AND ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: PARTICIPATION, VALUES, AND
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 146-61 (Luca Tacconi ed., 2000).
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It would amount to nothing more than an incomplete and fragmented vision, doing
little to synthesize ecological understanding with legal recourse.61
Because no discourse on proper land use is complete without considering
private lands, the normative claim introduced above should be more finely stated:
we ought not misuse nature, whether on public or private land. Accepting this
proposition requires us to engage in the more difficult task of healing schisms
between private property and environmental stewardship. We must answer thorny
questions like what limits are proper to the use of nature on private lands? Or, put
differently, what public ownership rights are inherent in private land? Answers to
these questions must be consistent with the common law of property and must
respect private property as an institution.62 Otherwise, legislative efforts will
undoubtedly meet staunch resistance from landowners and potentially run afoul of
regulatory takings law.
The following subsections examine public ownership of nature on private
lands. The first subsection considers from an ecological perspective why the public
should have an interest in nature on private land. The second subsection goes on to
examine the false dichotomy that clouds perceptions of private property, exploring
property law's capacity to protect public welfare on private lands.
1. The Ecological Case For Public Interest In Private Lands
There are certain elements of the natural world that are vital to a functioning
society and therefore should not be entirely under private control. The law has
recognized this truth in other settings for quite some time, as illustrated by the
public trust doctrine's protection of public rights in navigable waterways. 63 As the
study of ecology has evolved, we have begun to understand how other elements of
nature also provide invaluable benefits to society at large and are therefore worthy
64
of protection against unfettered private use. In particular, our understanding of
ecology has matured to the point where we now appreciate that nature is an
61 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity,
and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 212-13 (2001) (explaining the need to involve
multiple landowners (public and private) because single parcels are too small to address
ecosystem issues); see also Adler, supra note 59, at 302 ("Without conservation on private
lands, meaningful ecological conservation cannot be achieved.").
62 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 122 ("The protection of lands and communities is a
goal that inevitably needs balancing against the benefits that the community gets when
landowners are reasonably secure in their entitlements.").
63 See supra note 24 for a brief discussion of the public trust doctrine.
6 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 31, at 789-97 (describing how an evolved ecological
understanding of wetlands has changed its treatment in the law from one of disgust to one
of reverence and protection); see also Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are
Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL
ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3-4 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
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interconnected whole and that vital societal functions are derived from protecting
certain ecosystem services.
"Ecosystem services" are generally defined as "the conditions and processes
through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and
fulfill human life."6 6 For example, freshwater systems supply drinking water,
habitat, and instream benefits (like recreation, transportation, and flood control).
Forests prevent erosion, reduce sedimentation, and sequester carbon. 6 8 Grasslands
conserve soils, maintain the genetic library, and stabilize the composition of the
atmosphere. 6 9 Soil moderates the climate, supports plants, and disposes of dead
organic matter.70 Natural predators, parasites, and pathogens control pests that
threaten agricultural crops.7 1
Because nature is a network of systems and services, all alterations of the land
have consequences. One cannot destroy a wetland, for instance, without impacting
72the ecosystem service of water retention. Similarly, one cannot develop forested
watersheds without degrading the service of water purification.73
Not only is nature interconnected, but nature and its services also cannot
readily be substituted by technological enterprise and human engineering. In an
article discussing the obstacles of regulating ecosystem services, Professor James
Salzman recounts the failed Biosphere II experiment in the early 1990s. It is an
example of the complex underpinnings of nature's systems:
65 Daily, supra note 64, at 3.
66 id
67 Sandra Postel & Stephen Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 64, at 195, 195-
207.
68 Norman Myers, The World's Forests and Their Ecosystem Services, in NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 64, at 215, 215-
36.
69 Id Grasslands contribute to the genetic library because of the abundant biodiversity
located in that ecosystem. Also, a large fraction of domesticated species originated from
grasslands, and the wild populations related to those domesticated species (along with their
associated pests and pathogens) continue to thrive in grasslands. These areas are, therefore,
most likely to provide information and strains of species that are resistant to disease.
Osvaldo E. Sala & Jos6 M. Paruelo, Ecosystem Services in Grasslands, in NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 64, at 237, 242-
43.
70 Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services Supplied by Soil, in NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 64, at 113, 113-
32.
7 Rosamond L. Naylor & Paul R. Ehrlich, Natural Pest Control Services and
Agriculture, in NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS,
supra note 64, at 151, 151-74.
72 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 43, at 157.
7 Id.
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In understanding the power and challenge of ecosystem services, it
is best to start our story fifteen years ago, beneath the blazing Arizona
desert sun. There, on September 26, 1991, walking through a crowd of
reporters and flashing cameras, eight men and women entered a huge,
glass-enclosed structure and sealed shut the outer door. Their 3.15 acre
miniature world, called Biosphere II, had been designed with no expense
spared to re-create the conditions of the earth. . . . Biosphere II sought to
re-create a truly self-sustaining environment, complete with designer
rainforest, ocean, marsh, savanna, and desert habitats. The eight plucky
adventurers, so-called "Bionauts," intended to remain inside this micro-
world for two years. By sixteen months into their adventure, however,
oxygen levels had plummeted 33%, nitrous oxide levels had increased
160-fold to levels causing brain damage, ants and vines had overrun the
vegetation, and nineteen of the twenty-five vertebrate species had gone
extinct, as well as all of the pollinators. The experiment was
abandoned.74
Despite the budget of $200 million, recreating the basic services that sustain
human life proved to be both a daunting feat and a failed experiment.7 5 Given the
troubles and expenses that the Biosphere project encountered in its attempts to
replicate nature's intricacies, we should not expect that we can simply engineer our
way out of ecological problems. Some foresight in protecting nature from misuse
is a necessary step towards creating a sustainable and healthy future for
humankind.
The knowledge that nature is interconnected and that ecosystem services are
valuable to human existence is not new. Lamenting soil erosion caused by
deforestation, Plato once wrote:.
[w]hat now remains of the formerly rich land is like the skeleton of a sick
man with all the fat and soft earth having wasted away and only the bare
framework remaining ... The soil [used to be] deep, it absorbed and kept
the water . . . , and the water that soaked into the hills fed springs and
76
running streams everywhere.
In the more modem era, George Perkins Marsh heralded the role of
microorganisms is sustaining life when he explained that "[e]arth, water, the ducts
and fluids of vegetable and of animal life, the very air we breathe, are peopled by
74 James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133, 133 (2006).
7 Id.
76 Daily, supra note 64, at 5-6 (quoting Plato in DANIEL HILLEL, OUT OF THE EARTH:
CIVILIZATION AND THE LIFE OF THE SOIL 104 (1991)).
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minute organisms which perform most important functions in both the living and
inanimate kingdoms of nature."7
Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson have similarly trumpeted the importance of
understanding and preserving the valuable services that intact ecosystems can
provide. Leopold eloquently wrote in 1948:
If the land mechanism as a whole is good, then every part is good,
whether we understand it or not. If the biota, in the course of aeons, has
built something we like but do not understand, then who but a fool would
discard seemingly useless parts? To keep every cog and wheel is the first
precaution of intelligent tinkering.78
Some years later, in the famed Silent Spring, Rachel Carson captured the
interconnectedness of humans and living systems through the simple words "in
nature nothing exists alone."
Though our understanding of ecosystem services has been percolating in the
minds of some for many years, scholars trace growing mainstream appreciation for
these services to the publication of Nature's Services in 1997.8o This was the mark
of a new era in which ecologists, economists, and lawyers began to systematically
examine the contributions of ecological services to social welfare.8 ' Written by
well-respected scientists and economists, Nature's Services explained in great
detail the services that ecosystems provide to society, with separate chapters
devoted to climate, biodiversity, soil, pollinators, pest control, and major biomes
(for example, oceans, freshwater, forests, grasslands).8 2 Nature's Services was also
the first serious attempt to put a dollar figure on the value of ecosystem services -
pollinators, for example, were estimated to contribute a $4-7 billion to the United
States agricultural economy each year.83
77 GEORGE P. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE; OR, PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY AS MODIFIED
BY HUMAN ACTION 123 (1864).
78 Aldo Leopold, The Round River, in ROUND RIVER: FROM THE JOURNALS OF ALDO
LEOPOLD 143, 146-47 (Luna E. Leopold ed., 1993).
7 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 51 (1962). Carson similarly emphasized the
interconnectedness of living systems when she stressed that the soil community "consists
of a web of interwoven lives, each in some way related to the others-the living creatures
depending on the soil, but the soil in turn a vital element of the earth only so long as this
community within it flourishes." Id. at 56.
80 See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 43, at 158.
81 James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and
Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310 (2001).
82 See Daily, supra note 64, at 6-10.
83 Gary Paul Nabhan & Stephen L. Buchmann, Services Provided by Pollinators, in
NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 64, at
133, 141.
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Since the release of Nature's Services, there have been numerous scientific
studies describing and valuing ecosystems services around the world.84 One salient
example is the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ("the Assessment"), which
consisted of a series of reports published between 2001 and 2005 assessing how
changes in ecosystem services impact human well-being. The Assessment was
modeled on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and involved
approximately 1,360 experts from over 95 different countries. 86 It starts with the
premise that "[e]veryone in the world depends completely on the Earth's
ecosystems and the services they provide, such as food, water, disease
management, climate regulation, spiritual fulfillment, and aesthetic enjoyment."
One of the Assessment's major findings is that sixty percent of the ecosystem
services studied "are being degraded or used unsustainably, including fresh water,
capture fisheries, air and water purification, and the regulation of regional and
local climate, natural hazards, and pests."88 Stop and think about those two
statements in concert. Ecosystem services are our lifelines. We are destroying over
half of those lifelines.
2. False Dichotomy Between Natural Resources Protection on Public
and Private Land
The importance of ecosystem services to society at large, and the fact that
many of these vital services happen to fall on private lands, demonstrate the need
for a legal regime that protects those services from unfettered private control.
Protecting nature's services, therefore, requires that we embrace property law's
legitimate role in serving public welfare as well as private interests.
The idea that public ownership rights exist on private lands is neither new nor
radical. Many property scholars, having traced the historical foundations of
property law in much detail, argue for a more public-rights based model of
property.89 Based on a more mature understanding of the interconnectedness of
nature and ecosystem services, scholars like Professors Sax and Freyfogle have
concluded that reviving the voice of public ownership and communal needs to the
84 For citations to works published on ecosystem services, see Ruhl & Salzman, supra
note 43, at 161.
85 See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-
BEING SYNTHESIS (2005), available at http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.
356.aspx.pdf.
86 Id. at viii.
' Id at 1.
88 Id
8 Numerous commentators have championed "an ecological image of private
property," including DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF
ECOLOGICAL IDEAS (2d ed. 1994); Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature
Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11, 62-65 (2000); Sax,
supra note 26, at 1433; The Particulars of Owning, supra note 21, at 584.
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institution of property is both correct and necessary. 90 Reviving that voice is
necessary to prevent undue and irreversible damage to ecosystem services. It is
also correct in that the institution of property both protects societal needs and
preserves individual rights.
To understand why a public rights view of property is consistent with natural
resource protection and property law, consider how property was conceived at the
birth of this nation. As a historical matter, property rights were created to serve
public welfare and not just individual interests.9' Indeed, the reigning republican
view of property recognized that "property is held by the individual in trust for the
benefit of society as a whole."92 Implicit in that statement is the understanding that
private property exists only because of society's agreement to protect the interests
of the individual. In exchange for that protection, private interests must in some
cases give way to the greater needs of society. 94
Professor Freyfogle has been a prominent voice in this important discourse. In
The Land We Share, he reminds us that limits on land uses are deeply engrained in
the institution of private property. Those limits prevent harm to other landowners
or society as a whole. He explains that at the beginning of this nation's history,
"[c]ourts agreed that legislatures possessed broad powers to control how private
land was used. Even for Chief Justice Roger Taney, a Southern conservative and
author of the proslavery Dred Scott decision, private desires were properly
subordinated to public need." 95
Early on, and throughout much of the eighteenth century, property law
continued to yield significant respect for societal welfare. 9 6 For example,
"[o]wners of attractive sites for water mills could have their lands seized if they
failed to use them in the public interest."97 Indeed, many colonial and early federal-
era laws "went well beyond the avoidance of harm to impose affirmative duties on
90 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 9 ("It is possible, I believe, for the Constitution to
give lawmakers substantial power to redefine the rights of landowners, bringing them up to
date and promoting conservation, while at the same time heightening the protections
landowners enjoy against unfair government treatment."); Sax, supra note 26, at 1451-52;
see also Goldstein, supra note 12, at 429; Wilgus, supra note 11, at 100 ("[T]raditional
notions of property law must contend with new scientific discoveries about our
environment as well as popular notions of an environmental ethic.").
9 Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward A "Broader Vision" of
Property Rights," 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 529, 530 (1988) ("[T]he history of views of private
property suggests that this country was founded on the ideal of protecting not only private
property but also the social good.").
92 Id. at 532.
93 d. at 533.
94 d
95 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 5.
96 Id. at 58-63.
97 Id. at 60.
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private owners to help achieve social aims." 98 Evidence of community-minded
views of property rights found its way into the Supreme Court's 1887 decision
Mugler v. Kansas.99 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan reiterated that "all
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of
it shall not be injurious to the community." 00
Though many individual laws regulated land use in the public interest
throughout the eighteenth century,10 ' the recognition of public interests in private
lands was expressed most directly and uniformly through the common law doctrine
sic utere tuo ut alienum laedas ("sic utere tuo"). This doctrine translates to mean,
"use your own so as to cause no harm"; it is referred to as the "no harm" rule for
short.10 2 Under this doctrine, otherwise reasonable land uses were restricted if they
caused harm to other landowners or to the public at large.' 0 3
Over time, society's perception of what constitutes harm (and benefits) to the
public at large has changed. In the beginning, the "no harm" rule gave rise to
applications like the natural-flow rule, where landowners had the right to use water
only in ways that left downstream users unaffected.10 4 By contrast, during the
industrial revolution, society began to elevate the importance of economic
development such that developing natural resources was unequivocally seen as a
public benefit. 0 5 The result is a conception of property that would-when viewed
purely from a common law perspective-permit landowners to "use land for
maximum gain," even when such use "severely disrupted neighbors." 06
The common law picture of private property is not complete, however. The
role of protecting natural resources from harm has shifted principally from
common law to public, or statutory, law. Aside from the common law doctrine of
nuisance, environmental statutes are now primarily responsible for regulating land
uses and protecting nature from harm.' 0 7 Therefore, when environmental
regulations are criticized for undermining individual freedom on private lands, we
would be wise to remember that those regulations help fill in the complete picture
of private property--one that has always embodied a healthy respect for public
interest (whether in the common law itself or in the public law).
Though the public-rights based view of private property has a strong legacy,
another voice could be heard in the property debate, one that would grow louder
and more forceful over time-the voice of Federalists like James Madison who
stressed the importance of individual rights and sought freedom from
8 Id at 62.
9 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
'oo Id. at 665.
1o1 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 60.
102 Id. at 67.
103 See id.
14Id.
os See id. at 65-99.
os Id. at 72-73.
'07 See id. at 83-84.
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governmental interference as much as possible.'08 Indeed, somewhere around the
turn of the nineteenth century, with the coming of the Industrial Revolution,
pressures for development and economic advances began to overshadow
detrimental consequences of destroying public resources for private gain.' 09 Soon
these pressures changed perceptions of property rights and gave rise to a divisive
vision of property, pitting public welfare against private interests.1o
The 1922 Supreme Court decision Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon"' aptly
illustrates and foreshadows the dichotomous views that continue today.112 Justice
Holmes, writing for the majority, concluded that to steer clear of the Fifth
Amendment, statutes could limit uses of private property only to a minor degree." 3
On the other hand, Justice Brandeis echoed public-rights based views of private
property in his dissent when he urged that no regulatory takings should be found
where the statute "merely prevents the owner from making a use that interferes
with the paramount rights of the public.""14
These two voices have continued their uneasy duet in the property debate
throughout the settlement and development of this nation. Today, the voice of
those who would elevate private property rights and financial interests above the
public good can most readily be found in leaders of the "wise use" movement.115
More specifically, under the banner of regulatory takings, wise use leaders have
rounded up a broad range of economic and political interests, including developers,
small property owners, and timber companies into the so-called "property rights"
movement.'1 6
108 Anderson, supra note 91, at 533-34.
109 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 62-63, 65.
110 Id.; see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 7, at 20-21 (describing as a "universal
benchmark" the idea that property can be held in absolute ownership and that any
government regulation therefore curtails private property rights).
. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
112 See id. at 415-16. For a discussion about how the property rights debate has
evolved and continued throughout the twentieth century, see Anderson, supra note 91, at
537-62.
113 See Anderson, supra note 91, at 538 (summarizing divisive views in Pennsylvania
Coal).
114 See id (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
" See, e.g., DAVID HELVARG, THE WAR AGAINST THE GREENS: THE "WISE-USE"
MOVEMENT, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE BROWNING OF AMERICA-REVISED AND UPDATED
(2004); see also The Wise Use Agenda: The Citizen's Guide to Environmental Resource
Issues (Alan M. Gottlieb ed., 1989).
116 The origins of the regulatory takings movement have been attributed to the
libertarian ideals espoused by Professor Richard Epstein. See Christine Klein, The New
Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV.
1155, 1186 (2007) (explaining that Epstein's work serves as "the intellectual blueprint for
the modem property rights movement"); see also Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord,
The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 510 (1998) ("[M]any of the changes in takings law that have
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In their newsletters, journals, books, and presentations, leaders of the wise use
movement routinely argue that environmental regulations are destroying private
property rights.'1 7 This rhetoric asserts that environmentalists have generated an
avalanche of regulatory red tape that threatens to suffocate small property owners
and destroy industrial civilization altogether. "Supporters of both privatization and
strong individual property rights distrust-and at times, even scorn-government
regulation conducted in the name of the public interest." 1 8
Although extreme, the property rights movement is the product of divisive
rhetoric that pits the public interest against the private one. This world-in which
regulation of private property for the public good is characterized as an intrusion of
rights-is premised on a false dichotomy between public interest and private
rights. It is false not because divisive viewpoints have been absent from our
history, but because the views that pit private and public rights against one another
(1) do not reflect the physical realities of nature and (2) do not appreciate property
law's capacity for simultaneously protecting private rights and public resources.
On the first point, natural resources do not differentiate between private and
public lands." 9 Resources that are important to the public interest, such as
privately owned wetlands, cannot be segregated from private ownership any more
than valuable topsoil can be dug up and set aside for cultivating society's food. So
long as land is privately held, certain resources that are invaluable to society's
healthy functioning inevitably will be in private control. In other words, it would
taken place over the last 11 years correspond quite closely to a blueprint for takings
doctrine proposed by Professor Richard Epstein in his now-famous book called Takings,
Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain."). Epstein "advanced a notion of
property rights under which individuals should not be forced to bear community burdens."
Klein, supra at 1186. Epstein called for a broad application of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, admitting that his expansive interpretation would call into question "many
of the heralded reforms and institutions of the twentieth century: zoning, rent control,
workers' compensation laws, transfer payments, progressive taxation." RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, at x (1985).
Other scholars have taken similarly aggressive stances and argued that many environmental
regulations amount to regulatory takings and improperly impede on private property rights.
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 91, at 536 n.41 (citing Ellen Frankel Paul, Moral
Constraints and Eminent Domain: A Review Essay of Richard Epsteins's Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 177-78 (1986))
(arguing that Epstein's attack on social legislation does not go far enough).
117 For a description and detailed discussion of the property rights movement, see
Kendall & Lord, supra note 116, at 510-14.
1 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 116, at 1166.
1'9 Anderson, supra note 91, at 536 n.38 ("'[W]hatever the state of its title, one parcel
of land is inextricably intertwined with other parcels, and ... causes and effects flow across
artificially imposed divisions in the land without regard for legal boundaries. The land
simply cannot be neatly divided into mine and yours."' (quoting Donald W. Large, This
Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 1039,
1045)).
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be impossible to set aside or buy up every piece of private land that served some
public function. Not only that, but ecosystem health will often turn on more than
the health of an individual parcel of land; the value of some resources manifest as
part of a larger landscape that spans multiple parcels and multiple landowners. So
while some land uses are harmful on their own because of soil erosion or critical
habitat destruction, other land uses are harmful in the aggregate. "When too many
fields in a watershed are plowed, or too many fields are drained, or too much
wildlife habitat is altered, or too many homes are built in an area, or too much
impervious pavement distorts hydrologic patterns, the ecological status of entire
landscapes can be degraded."' 20
The issue of aggregate harm is worth probing because it helps to explain the
need for a coordinated legal system that identifies and remedies the misuse of
nature. In general, the idea that private land practices can be individually
insignificant but collectively destructive is analogous to Garrett Hardin's "tragedy
of the commons."' 2 1 As Hardin explains, unregulated and limited resources that are
shared communally will eventually be depleted..12 2 In this case-where ecosystem
health is depleted from unregulated and uncoordinated land use-the problem is
similar in that ecosystem services are common resources benefitting society as a
whole. But the problem is also different in that ecosystems services cross many
land parcels, some of which are publicly managed and other of which are privately
held.
The problem with ensuring ecosystem health is more like a "tragedy of
fragmentation." 23 Our current predication arises from uncoordinated land use
practices despite the interconnectedness of nature. As such, Hardin's suggestion
that land be divided and placed into private ownership is not a satisfactory solution
for resolving current land use problems. In fact, one might consider taking Hardin
up on his other, less-discussed, suggestion that would mitigate aggregate harm by
placing restraints on land use practices: "mutual coercion, mutually agreed
upon." 2 4 Consistent with Hardin's analysis, the solution to ecosystem health will
require considering land use practices in the aggregate and some measure of
collective restraint.
In light of our greater understanding about what constitutes harmful land use
and what comprises the public welfare, revitalization of common law doctrines
120 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 221.
121 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-48 (1968).
122 To illustrate his theory, Hardin supposes that several herders share a field for
grazing cows. Id. at 1244-45. Even though overgrazing will eventually destroy the
resource, Hardin suggests that it is in each herder's interest to put additional cows into the
field given that all the benefits 'of grazing and additional cow will be reaped by the
individual but all the damage will be shared by the -group as a whole. Id. Central to
Hardin's example is that the commons is unregulated. Id.
123 For an excellent discussion and analysis of Hardin's work and connection to
modem day natural resource protection, see FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 158-74.
14 Id. at 160, 171-72.
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such as sic utero tuo is needed for property law to keep pace with new ecological
understanding. These fundamental doctrines and their specific applications need to
reappear in property law and regain proper respect along side other, well-funded
property rights such as the right to exclude. Indeed, as part of this effort at
revitalization we would be wise to recall the corollary common law principle of
salus populi suprema lex est-the welfare of the people is the supreme law.125
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1972 decision Just v. Marinette County1 26 is
an example of how property law can be more mindful of ecological realities and
begin to shift the balance of property rights more toward an equilibrium between
private and public welfare.12 7 In Just, the court upheld the constitutionality of a
shoreline protection law and prevented the Justs from filling in a wetland on the
south shore of Lake Noquebay in Marinette County. In so holding, the court
explained:
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of
others. The exercise of the police power in zoning must be reasonable
and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent
harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural
uses.128
Advocates of staunch private property rights would predictably be aghast at
the suggestion that all private lands are inherently limited by public ownership and
must give way to overarching societal interests.129 Again, such individualistic
views of property are born from a divisive rhetoric that fails to appreciate that
private and public interests are inextricably intertwined;' 30 private interests are still
served when property law imposes reasonable limitations on land use.
In all instances, property law resolves land use conflicts, either by allowing or
restricting an activity. Private interests are simultaneously expanded and curtailed.
The law simply decides whose private interests are given preference-those that
would use land intensely or those that would use their land in a less-disruptive
manner. On this point, Freyfogle concludes, "there is no 'pro-private property'
125 The need for the property law to keep pace with changing perceptions of public
welfare is not to argue that the common law can-or should-carry the weight of
protecting nature from misuse. This may well be a role best served by legislation.
Nonetheless, property law and the balance between private and public rights in the
ownership of nature must be restored in order for legislated protection to have legitimacy.
126 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
127 See id at 771 (discussing land value in terms of balancing private and public use).
128 Id. at 768.
129 See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
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position that the law can take."' 3 1 This is not to say that the policy choices have no
material consequences. Rather, elevating intensive land uses above all else will
harm other landowners, the public at large, and nature itself. In this way, intensive
land use weakens the property rights held by others, such as the right to enjoy land
free from unreasonable interference. Unfettered rights to use land without regard to
others, therefore, threaten the very institution of property. In other words, the
security of private property rights depends on limits.' 32
In the end, although divisive rhetoric is simple and effective for drumming up
controversy, private interests and public welfare cannot be separated out and pitted
against one another. Like nature itself, they are interconnected. Achieving
ecosystem health will require a more complete understanding of property. In doing
so, the voice of public welfare must return to any conversation about proper uses
of nature.
Fortunately, property is not a static institution. Instead, an important and well-
recognized aspect of property law is its flexibility to accommodate new
assumptions of what the public interest contains: "As a strictly legal matter,
landowners possess only such rights to develop as property law allows at any given
time. Property law, like other law, evolves to keep in line with shifting communal
needs." 3 3 It is because property law is capable of evolving that Professor Sax has
urged a new definition of property in light of what he termed the "economy of
nature."l 3 4 This new definition would respect the interconnectedness of nature and
the ability of undeveloped lands to serve valuable ecosystem functions.' 3 5 More
specifically, it would focus less on individual dominion, approach rights in land
from an ecosystem's perspective, recognize that different lands play different kinds
of roles, and impose affirmative obligations on landowners to "protect natural
services, with owners functioning as custodians as well as self-benefitting
entrepreneurs."' 3 6 Sax recognizes the mismatch between viewing private property
as an individualistic institution, a more sophisticated understanding of the natural
world, and the rich history of property law in serving communal needs. 3 1
If indeed there is a role for public ownership in private lands, one might
object to such an approach on the basis that achieving a balance between
protection of public resources and respect for private lands would be legally or
logistically difficult. It seems much easier, albeit detrimental, to accept a world
with bright line divisions between "yours" and "mine." Fortunately, there are
historical examples that shed light on how a workable relationship between public
rights and private ownership can be achieved. The area of water law and water
131 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 20.
132 See id at 18.
' Id. at 123; see also id at 208-09 (describing how perceptions of the communal
good have changed over time and how property law has responded accordingly).
134 Sax, supra note 26, at 1442.
135 See id at 1451.
136 id.
137 Id. at 1442-46.
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rights is a good example. Given the continuous, interconnected characteristics of
water, not to mention its importance to public welfare, water has never been
considered a good candidate for total privatization.'38 As a result, water has long
belonged to the people collectively, even when it runs underneath or through
private property-private owners possess only conditional rights to use the water
resource. 13 9 Their rights are limited to "reasonable" uses that are "beneficial."140
And, when community interests require, private property interests in water are
curtailed to serve public needs. 14 1
Likewise, the public trust doctrine, which historically safeguarded public
rights in navigable waterways, embodies the notion that the public possesses
inviolable rights in certain natural resources. 14 2 Wildlife has enjoyed similar
protection from unfettered private ownership because of its importance to public
welfare and natural movement in and out of private lands. 14 3 For these historically
elite resources, the subordination of private ownership to public rights continues to
this day. 14 4
Like water, many ecosystem functions serve the public welfare and are
manifestations of the interconnectedness of nature. 14 5 Just as laws have recognized
the importance of recognizing and protecting public rights for resources like water
and wildlife, the time is ripe to expand our vision and develop a legal framework
that recognizes public ownership in ecosystems services. As discussed above, a
legal framework that gives the public a voice in the misuse of nature on private
lands need not run afoul of private property rights.146 Rather, such a framework
would merely restore a long-recognized but recently forgotten element of property
138 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 231; Sax, supra note 26, at 1452-53.
139 See, e.g., Sax, supra note 26, at 1452-53.
140 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 231.
141 Sax, supra note 26, at 1453.
142 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 632 (1986).
143 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 230-38 (describing unique property relationships
for water and wildlife).
144 For example, several courts have upheld the power of government to prohibit
fences that would encumber movement of wildlife. See, e.g., Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1995) (upholding the validity of a law prohibiting fences
that interfered with an endangered species of deer); New York v. Sour Mountain Realty,
Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000) (upholding an order directing an landowner to
remove a 3500 foot long snake-proof fence that blocked the migration of an endangered
snake species). For a further illustration of the subordination of private interests in wildlife
management, see Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1575 (10th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting private landowner's argument that they had the exclusive "right to hunt the
'harvestable surplus' from their land-i.e., the excess animals available for hunting which
were produced on their land").
145 See supra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 93-117 and accompanying text.
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law: public ownership. What such a framework might look like and how it might
provide remedies for the misuse of nature is taken up in Part III of this Article.
II. THE NEED FOR A STATUTORY CIVIL REMEDY
If we accept the two foundational claims set forth in Part I-that we ought not
misuse nature and that the public has an interest in private lands-then we have
begun to redefine what it means to own and harm nature. With that new conception
of harm in place, we can begin to think about remedies. It might be useful,
however, to first consider why a new remedy is necessary within natural resource
and environmental law. In other words, why are lawmakers, practitioners, and
scholars still talking about a broken system of environmental protection when we
have "ten thousand commandments" 4 7 and hundreds of thousands of pages of
environmental statutes and regulations on the books?
For the purposes of appreciating the need for a new statutory civil remedy to
protect nature from misuse, there are three inherent limitations within the existing
legal framework that are important to explore. First, most environmental and
natural resources laws protect discrete elements of nature, not nature as an
interconnected whole. Second, and related to the first, there is a significant gap in
the law's protection of ecosystem services. Third, common law doctrines, such as
nuisance, are not sufficient to remedy harms to nature, especially when those
harms manifest as ills to society at large rather than discrete landowners.
A. Discrete Character of Environmental and Natural Resources Law
Environmental laws can be roughly divided into two categories: traditional
pollution control laws and natural resource laws.14 8 Traditional pollution control
laws regulate discharge, emission, disposal, and cleanup of industrial sources of
pollution. These laws segregate the environment into various media-air, water, or
waste. Classic examples include the Clean Air Act,14 9 the Clean Water Act,' the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,' 5 the Toxics Substances Control Act,152
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
147 Professor Bradley C. Karkkaninen uses the phrase "Ten Thousand
Commandments" as a shorthand reference to the sheer volume of regulatory mandates
embodied in our environmental laws. See Karkkaninen, supra note 37, at 75.
148 Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 717
(2007) (book review) (describing the distinction between natural resources law and
traditional pollution control laws).
149 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).
15o 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
'5' 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (2006).
152 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2006).
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Act.15 3 These federal statutes form the basis of state pollution control programs as
well. 154
Natural resource laws similarly divide nature into discrete elements, focusing
on extractable resources such as wildlife, minerals, timber, oil, and gas.' 55 Natural
resources law is largely "dominated by [a] 'resource-ist,' utilitarian approach
rather than by a naturalist intrinsic value approach." 56 In that spirit, Merriam-
Webster's dictionary defines "natural resources" as "industrial materials and
capacities (as mineral deposits and waterpower) supplied by nature." 5 7 Federal
examples of natural resource laws include the Endangered Species Act, 58 the
National Forest Management Act,' 59 the Mineral Leasing Act,16 0 and the Federal
Land Policy Management Act.' 6' At the state level, natural resource laws include
game programs that regulate fishing and hunting,' 62 forestry statutes that regulate
timber on state lands,16 3 and water codes that allocate water use and instream
flows.'" Overlapping both pollution control regulation and natural resource laws
are environmental statutes that are more ubiquitous in their application-namely
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)16 and their state equivalents. 66
'13 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
154 Many of the major federal pollution control statutes-the Clean Air Act, Clean
Water Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-are based on a concept of
cooperative federalism. They allow the EPA to delegate the programs to state agencies, so
long as certain minimum criteria are met. For a breakdown of the delegated programs
operated in each state. See ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, http://www.ecos.org (last
visited Feb. 19, 2012).
1 Lazarus, supra note 142, at 631 (describing natural resource law as "historically
concerned with the maintenance and orderly exploitation of basic natural resources such as
water, fossil fuels, oil, natural gas, mineral deposits, and timber. . . .").
156 Fischman, supra note 148, at 733; see also James Peck, Comment, Measuring
Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigating Natural Resources Damages, 14 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 275, 277 (1999) ("Traditional definitions of natural resources
were limited to resources providing quantifiable economic products such as industrial
minerals, energy sources, timber, and agricultural land.").
'5 Natural Resource Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/natural%20resource (last visited Feb. 19, 2012); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (6th ed. 1991) ("Any material in its native state which when
extracted has economic value . . . [and also] features which supply a human need and
contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-
being thereof. . . .").
15 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
19 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2006).
160 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2006).
1' 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2006).
162 See, e.g., Game and Fish, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A (West 2009 & Supp. 2010).
163 See, e.g., Idaho Forestry Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 38-102 (2011).
164 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.247 (West 2004).
165 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
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Despite the breadth of environmental media and parts of nature addressed in
these numerous federal and state statutes, no major laws focus on the protection of
ecosystems as a whole.16 7 By and large, our environmental regulatory regime
addresses discrete segments of nature on the overarching assumption that intense
management and regulation of the parts will ultimately protect the whole: "We are
accustomed to managing environmental and natural resource problems one-at-a-
time and in isolation from each other, as if pollution control, water supply,
fisheries management, and habitat conservation had nothing to do with each
166 In general terms, NEPA requires federal agencies to examine the impacts of major
federal actions on the environment before deciding on a course of action. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
NEPA does not mandate substantive outcomes; rather it requires agencies to consider
impacts of the propose action and viable alternatives. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Pub.
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756-57 (2004). Having done so, agencies are then free to choose
among its proposed alternatives. See id at 757. Unlike NEPA, some state environmental
protection statutes, or "little NEPAs," do provide substantive mandates. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 116D.04, Subd. 6 (West Supp. 2010) (prohibiting the state agency to approve
actions that significantly affect the environment if "there is a feasible and prudent
alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and
welfare"); see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.1 (West 2007) (defining feasible as
"capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time,
taking into account .. . environmental . . . factors."); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-
0109(1) (2005) ("Agencies shall ... act and choose alternatives which,.. . to the maximum
extent practicable, minimize or avoid adverse environmental effects . ... ).
167 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?,
66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555, 578 ("No single federal law can reasonably be portrayed as
encompassing all the goals of biodiversity conservation and the authorities needed to carry
them out."); Salzman, supra note 74, at 137 ("[I]t should come as no surprise that our laws
do not explicitly protect ecosystem services."); see also Mary Jane Angelo & Mark T.
Brown, Incorporating Emergy Synthesis into Environmental Law: An Integration of
Ecology, Economics, and Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 963, 967 (2007) ("The ecological
shortcomings in current environmental statutes are rooted in the fact that most
environmental statutes were enacted in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to many of the recent
developments in the ecological sciences, and most of these statutes are media-based rather
than 'system'-based."); Salzman et al., supra note 81, at 309-10 ("In recommending that
reduced ecological risk become a primary focus of EPA, its scientists and managers have
revealed the single greatest failing of modern environmental law and its greatest challenge
today-the inadequate protection of ecosystems and the services they provide.").
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other."1 6 8 This is true regardless of the distinctions drawn between pollution
control laws and natural resource laws.169
Of course, there are some aspects of existing environmental and natural
resource laws that do provide indirect opportunities for ecosystem protection.' 70
The most notable of these opportunities come from NEPA's requirement that
federal agencies broadly examine the indirect and cumulative impacts of their
actions,' 7' the Endangered Species Act's protection of habitat as a critical aspect of
species recovery,' 72 and the Clean Water Act's Section 404 regulation of
wetlands.17 3 Each of these statutes, however, contains significant limitations in
their ability to fill the gap of ecosystem protection.
For instance, NEPA appears to be a promising tool for ecosystem-level
protection because it requires an expansive examination of impacts beyond a
particular species, discrete element, or isolated media of nature.174 But NEPA is
168 Karkkainen, supra note 61, at 204; see also Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without
Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources
Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1241 (2008) (noting the growing scholarship advocating "a
holistic approach to environmental protection, moving away from a focus on separate
media like air, water, and waste.").
169 Salzman, supra note 74, at 136-37 (explaining that neither pollution control laws,
conservation laws, nor resource management laws provide legal standards for conserving
natural capital and ecosystem services).
170 For a comprehensive survey and analysis of federal laws with some biodiversity
conservation potential, see Ruhl, supra note 167.
'7' 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2001).
172 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2006) (requiring the Secretary to designate habitat to an
endangered or threatened species).
1 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). There are also some provisions of federal land
management statutes that would appear, to require a broader vision for ecosystem
management by prohibiting degradation of certain resources. For example, the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act prohibits "unnecessary or undue degradation" of the
lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006). While
promising in theory, such provisions have not historically had much effect: "The reality of
natural resources law is that commodity users have overridden the good intentions and
discretionary language of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, the National Forest Management Act, and similar statutes
without breaking stride." Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 882-83 (1997); see also NAGLE & RUHL, supra note
30, at 72 (citing MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 278 (3d ed. 1997)) ("[W]ildlife law is not a commanding force
in federal land management. It is one of several management objectives on all major
federal land classifications . . . . It is not the exclusive, or even the dominant goal on any
lands but the national wildlife refuges.").
174 In its simplicity, NEPA requires all federal agencies to consider the impacts of
major actions having a potentially significant impact on the human environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (2006); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 347-
50 (1989). As part of that consideration, agencies must examine not only direct, but also
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limited in notable ways.'7 5 First, it applies only to major federal actions, which
means that actions on nonfederal lands are outside NEPA's reach unless they are
otherwise connected to federal approval or funding. Second, even when it does
apply, NEPA is procedural in nature; it requires agencies to consider impacts of
their actions but it does not require agencies to choose the environmentally
responsible alternative. '76 Indeed, it is a common observation that NEPA prevents
uninformed decisions, not unwise ones.
Unlike NEPA, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) does impose substantive
mandates; once a species is listed as endangered or threatened, the ESA
aggressively prohibits takings on both federal and nonfederal lands.'78 Notably, its
protections extend to habitat. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
regulations, for example, prohibit "significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."' 79 And though the
Supreme Court endorsed only a strict reading of this harm rule,'"s the FWS has
successfully used it to advance ecosystem protection goals by policing habitat
destruction.'1' Another important tool for habitat protection is the ESA's
indirect and cumulative impacts of its decision on a myriad of resources including "natural
systems." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2001). This includes evaluating all reasonably
foreseeable impacts in the larger context of the project. The CEQ regulations implementing
NEPA expressly provide that a project's potential to impact "ecologically critical areas"
informs whether the action is deemed "significant" within the meaning of the Act. Id. §
1508.27(b)(l)-(3).
175 For a more detailed critique of the limitations of NEPA in protecting ecosystems,
see David R. Hodas, NEPA, Ecosystem Management and Environmental Accounting, 14
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2000, at 185.
176 See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756-57 (2004) (quoting
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350) ("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results .... Rather
NEPA, imposes only procedural requirements on federal agencies. . . ."); Lands Council v.
Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004) ("NEPA imposes procedural requirements,
but not substantive outcomes, on agency action."); see also Ruhl, supra note 167, at 612-
13 (discussing NEPA's shortcomings as an effective biodiversity conservation tool,
including its "dearth of substantive effect").
17 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351.
178 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
17 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c)(3) (2010); see also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; Definition of "Harm," 64 Fed. Reg. 60,727, 60,727 (Nov. 8, 1999) (to be codified at
50 CFR Part 222) (NFMS final rule adopting a similar definition).
180 In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the rule as consistent with congressional intent but only to the
extent that the harm resulting from habitat modification is foreseeable and the proximate
cause of actual death or injury to identifiable individuals of the species. 515 U.S. 687, 711
(1995).
181 J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven Degrees of Relevance,
14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2000, at 156, 160-61.
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requirement that the FWS designate critical habitat for listed species.12 This tool,
however, is underutilized and largely dependent on litigation.183
Like NEPA, the tools available under the ESA can be used to advance some
broader ecosystem conservation goals. In the end, however, the ESA's focus has
been on protecting species, not ecosystems. This makes the ESA a poor substitute
for laws that are more specifically focused on ecosystem protection.184 Indeed,
182 This is especially the case when critical habitat designations are made for larger
predators with more expansive ranges and habitat needs. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter,
Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 293, 308 (1994) (describing the role that the ESA has played in constraining
development on large blocks of land in order to ensure grizzly bear recovery in the
Northern Rocky Mountains). But see Julie B. Bloch, Preserving Biological Diversity in the
United States: The Case for Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation's
Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 202 (1992) (noting one of the
shortcomings of the ESA is the fact that it "protects high profile species that do not usually
play an important role in overall biodiversity"); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and
Land, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 20 (1997) (A "well-understood limitation of the ESA is that
it has generally afforded greater protection to high-profile 'charismatic' species, especially
large vertebrates, at the expense of lesser-known or less popular species.").
183 In reality, the critical habitat designation requirement has failed to protect
approximately two-thirds of listed species. In particular, in August 2007, the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service reported that critical habitat had been designated for only 492 of the 1351
listed endangered and threatened species. U.S. FIsH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, CRITICAL
HABITAT: WHAT IS IT? 2 (2007), available at http://library.fws.gov/Pubs9/
critical habitat07.pdf; see also Patrick Parenteau, An Empirical Assessment of the Impact
of Critical Habitat Litigation on the Administration of the Endangered Species Act (Vt.
Law School Faculty Papers, Paper No. 1, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgil
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context-vermontlaw fp; Matthew D. Crawford, Note, The
Timing of Challenges to Compel Critical Habitat Designation Under the Endangered
Species Act: Should Courts Toll the General Federal Statute of Limitations?, 36 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 497 (2009). Moreover, most of those designations have come in direct
response to litigation and court-ordered timelines. In fact, between 1990 and 2005, 350 out
of 357 critical habitats designated by FWS were the result of litigation. Parenteau, supra at
2 n.7. "Each critical habitat designation made since 1997 has resulted from a court order or
a settlement agreement. . . ." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-803, ENDANGERED
SPECIES: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE LISTING
DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED FOR CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS
34 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03803.pdf So while the number of
listed species afforded critical habitat designations has climbed from roughly nine percent
in 1999 to thirty-six percent in 2007, the Fish & Wildlife Service acknowledges that this
increase is due, in large part, to litigation.
184 Houck, supra note 173, at 870 ("One of the more rational conclusions to emerge
from American's experience with the Endangered Species Act is that we need to manage
ecosystems and protect biological diversity on a scale larger than individual species on the
brink of doom."); Keiter, supra note 182, at 307-09 (explaining the limitations of the ESA
and concluding that "although the ESA breaches conventional boundary lines and protects
enumerated species against extinction, it cannot be regarded as a general ecosystem
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notwithstanding the ESA's promise "to provide a means whereby ecosystems upon
which endangered and threatened species depend may be conserved,"' 8 ' no other
provision of the ESA contains action measures specific to ecosystem protection.
Moreover, the ESA's ability to serve double duty as an ecosystem protection
statute is limited by the fundamental reality that species only trigger the protections
of the Act when they are endangered or threatened with extinction over a
significant portion of their range.' 86 Benefits of the ESA to ecosystems therefore
come from a reactive posture; they only become effective after habitats and their
broader ecosystem functions have already been curtailed or adversely modified.
It is worth examining one last example of an environmental statue that has
potential to protect some parts of ecosystems. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for the "discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites."' 87
Although this section does not actually mention wetlands, its permitting
regulations construe the term "navigable waters" broadly to include wetlands.'88
Over time, Section 404 has become synonymous with wetlands regulation' 8 9-it
prohibits wetlands from being drained without some balancing of the expected
benefits of the permitted activity and its potential for environmental harm. 90
Although the CWA plays an important role in protecting at least one ecosystem
service, wetlands are but one piece of an ecosystem, and protecting wetlands
cannot substitute for broader ecosystem protection. As useful as the CWA is, it is
not (and does purport to be) a complete package for ensuring the longevity of
ecosystem services as a whole.'91
management statute."); Ruhl, supra note 167, at 589 ("The ESA thus is too inflexible both
in substantive effect and biological scope to provide a comprehensive, broadly accepted
approach to biodiversity conservation policy.").
i1 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) (2006).
186 Bloch, supra note 182, at 201 (critiquing the ESA's usefulness in preserving
biodiversity and noting the piecemeal, reactive character of the Act that only "rescue[s] a
species when its population dwindles below a certain level.").
18' 33 U.S.C. §1344(a) (2006).
188 See Corps of Engineers' General Regulatory Policies, 33 C.F.R. § 320 (2012).
189 With some exceptions for isolated, wholly intrastate wetlands, nearly all wetlands
are protected from unpermitted drainage and fill activities. For a discussion of the scope of
wetlands regulation endorsed by the Supreme Court after Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), and United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985), see Jamison E. Colbum, Waters of the
United States: Theory, Practice, and Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 183 (2007); see also Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A
Program in Search of a Policy, 55 ALA. L. REv. 607, 621-30 (2004).
190 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (requiring balancing of benefits and harm of the proposed
permitted activity); see also id. § 320.4(b) (discouraging destruction of wetlands as
"contrary to the public interest"); Ruhl, supra note 167, at 604.
1 There are other aspects of the Clean Water Act that could evoke a broader-based
view of ecosystems. For example, the requirement that the EPA develop "total maximum
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B. Gaps in Protection ofEcosystem Services
Assorted provisions-isolated within disconnected statutes, administered by
different agencies, and providing only indirect tools-are hardly an appropriate
substitute for the broad-based and comprehensive legal regime that is necessary to
effectively protect ecosystems. Indeed, most scholars agree that the complex web
of environmental statutes has been largely unsuccessful at providing adequate
protections to ecosystems on a holistic basis.192 Fifteen years ago, Professor J.B.
Ruhl observed that "[n]o single federal law purports to encompass all that is meant
by biodiversity conservation; rather, a handful of different statutes addresses
particular facets of biological resource protection on nonfederal lands. Gluing
those laws together without any clear, unifying principles has not created an
effective, flexible system of biodiversity conservation."' 93 More recently, Professor
Annecoos Wiersema reiterated, "most commentators now seem willing to agree
with two propositions. First, environmental law must be responsive to ecological
insights about the complexity of natural systems. Second, traditional approaches to
environmental law appear insufficiently responsive to science, and further,
insufficiently flexible even to develop responsiveness to science."1 94
This conclusion has been similarly expressed by federal agencies, lamenting
the inability .of the current regulatory web to adequately protect important
daily loads" (TMDLs) for impaired waterways has the potential to elicit a more
comprehensive assessment of all the sources of pollution that give rise to unacceptable
levels of pollutants. TMDLs, therefore, force evaluation of nonpoint as well as point
sources of pollution and could be used to understand pollution issues on a watershed basis.
For a discussion of TMDLs as a tool for watershed-based pollution control, see Michael M.
Wenig, How "Total" Are "Total Maximum Daily Loads "?-Legal Issues Regarding the
Scope of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 87, 106 (1998).
192 See Angelo & Brown, supra note 167, at 967 ("Environmental law's current
integration of ecological science is overly simplistic, ad hoc, and outdated."); Fischman,
supra note 148, at 741 ("Over the past thirty-five years, both environmental law and natural
resources law have struggled to broaden their scopes to encompass ecological concerns.");
Karkkaninen, supra note 147, at 77 (noting that the current approach to environmental
protection has not been "effective in the more complex and integrative tasks of protecting
ecosystems"); Karkkainen, supra note 61, at 197 ("[W]e have constructed an architecture
of laws and management systems that are poorly matched to the challenge of managing
ecosystems as complex dynamic systems."); Ruhl, supra note 167, at 561-62 (arguing that
a more effective federal policy for conserving biodiversity "would come from melding the
disorganized system of federal biodiversity conservation regulation into a single law
designed principally to promote biodiversity conservation"); Wiersema, supra note 168, at
1249 ("[L]aws that focus on one medium, such as air, water, land, or individual species,
will not adequately take account of the multiple connections.").
193 Ruhl, supra note 167, at 565.
194 Wiersema, supra note 168, at 1245.
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ecosystem functions. In 1994, the EPA exclaimed the need for a more place-driven
approach to environmental protection in a planning report named the Edgewater
Consensus:
To date, the EPA has accomplished a great deal, addressing many
major sources of pollution to the nation's air, water and land. Yet, even
as we resolve the more obvious problems, scientists discover other
environmental stresses that threaten our ecological resources and general
well-being.
... Although many federal, state, and local regulations address these
problems, past efforts have been as fragmented as our authorizing
statutes. Because EPA has concentrated on issuing permits, establishing
pollutant limits, and setting national standards, the Agency has not paid
enough attention to the overall environmental health of specific
ecosystems. In short, EPA has been "program-driven" rather than "place-
driven."
Recently, we have realized that, even if we had perfect compliance
with all our authorities, we could not assure the reversal of disturbing
environmental trends.' 95
A report published by the United States General Accounting Office around
the same time similarly concluded that "[e]ven though many laws have been
enacted to protect individual natural resources-air, water, soils, plants, and
animals, including forests, rangelands, threatened and endangered species,
195 Ecosystem Prot. Workgroup, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Toward a Place-Driven
Approach: The Edgewater Consensus on an EPA Strategy for Ecosystem Protection (Draft
1994), in THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 30, at
363, 363; see also, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 200-B-94-002, THE NEW GENERATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A SUMMARY OF EPA's FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN 2
(1994) ("In the past, the Agency's division into air, water, and land programs led EPA to
overlook both the cross-media effects of some pollution problems and the potential for new
kinds of cross-media programs."); ScI. ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAB-
EC-90-021, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 6 (1990) (recommending the EPA reset its priorities to "attach as much
importance to reducing ecological risk as it does to reducing human health risk"); Bloch,
supra note 182, at 200) ('Many U.S. laws mandate conservation of some aspect of
biological diversity, from the broad mandate of the National Forest Management Act to the
habitat conservation approach of the Endangered Species Act . . . . Nevertheless, these
programs and statutes do not form a coherent comprehensive framework for assessing or
ensuring progress toward a common goal . . . .' (quoting COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
U.S. NATIONAL REPORT PREPARED FOR SUBMISSION TO THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 69 (Draft 1991) (on file with CEQ))); Salzman et al.,
supra note 81, at 309 ("The top managers and scientific advisors in the [EPA] have
consistently declared that maintenance of productive natural systems demands more
attention and should, in fact, become one of the agency's highest priorities.").
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wetlands, and wilderness areas-ecological conditions on many federal lands have
declined." 9 6
In conjunction with these and other recognitions of statutory shortcomings,
many federal agencies, including the four major public land management agencies,
prepared statements and guidelines in the mid-1990s expressing their commitment
to more broad-based ecosystem management.' 97 For example, the Department of
Interior proposed a national biological survey that would inventory the nation's
natural resources. The purpose was to "get, at least, a first cut of how we relate to
these ecosystems."' 98 In December 1993, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
issued a report stating its intent to incorporate ecosystem management principles
into its oversight of public lands.'99 Among other things, the BLM envisioned "an
interdisciplinary approach to land management in which program advocacy will
yield to ecosystem advocacy." 200 The FWS issued a report in March 1994 that
described how to apply ecosystem management to fish and wildlife
conservation. 2 0 ' And, finally, the Forest Service released a report of its own in the
same year that pledged to follow four fundamental principles in its approach to
ecosystem management: (1) the use of an ecological approach to multiple-use
management; (2) application of the best scientific knowledge and technologies to
decision-making; (3) encouragement of partnerships with state agencies and
private landholders; and (4) the promotion of grass-roots participation in the
planning process. 20 2 The Forest Service even announced its intention to revise its
forest planning regulations to incorporate these four ecosystem management
principles. 2 03
Encouraging as it is that the major federal agencies understood the need for an
ecosystem focus to land management, did these recognitions of shortcomings and
statements of good intentions manifest genuine ecosystem management
requirements? In other words, was Professor Oliver Houck correct in 1997 when
he exclaimed, "tough odds call for precise law" and cautioned that amorphous
goals like ecosystem management would require teeth to be successful? 2 04
Perhaps the best evidence of progress, or lack thereof, lies in the scientific
assessment of continuing ecosystem, species, and habitat decline over the past
196 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING APPROACH 3 (1994).
197 See Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea, But What Is It,
Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1995, at 42, 43-45
(discussing federal agencies' efforts to incorporate ecosystem management principles into
their missions in the mid-1990s); see also NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 30, at 339-79.
198 Thompson, supra note 197, at 45.
199 Id
200 d
201 id.
202 Id. at 70.
203 id
204 Houck, supra note 173, at 883.
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decade. In November 2009, the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) published its 2008 Red List of Threatened Species, reporting that 17,291
205
species out of the 47,677 assessed species are threatened with extinction. In
particular, "the results reveal 21 percent of all known mammals, 30 percent of all
known amphibians, 12 percent of all known birds, and 28 percent of reptiles, 37
percent of freshwater fishes, 70 percent of plants, 35 percent of invertebrates
assessed so far are under threat." 20 6 Jane Smart, Director of IUCN's Biodiversity
Conservation Group remarked that "[t]he scientific evidence of a serious extinction
crisis is mounting." 207 While the ICUN Report analyzes the global patterns of
species and habitat loss, the United States features prominently among nations
with top-twenty numbers of threatened species for amphibians, birds, mammals,
and conifers. 20 8 This apparent failure to preserve biodiversity is a useful
benchmark of the law's failure to ensure ecosystem health more generally. 2 0 9
The failed effort to utilize existing environmental statutes as hard-nosed tools
for protecting ecosystems is also evidenced by the wealth of scholarship urging the
need for new approaches. Professors Mary Jane Angelo and Mark T. Brown
conclude that "[a]lthough many existing environmental laws pay lip service to
ecological science, they do not incorporate scientific understanding of the
ecological world in any meaningful way or are not implemented in a manner that
significantly incorporates ecological science." 210 To resolve this issue, Professor
Bradley Karkainnen argues for expanded embrace and coordination of
collaborative ecosystem governance.2 1 1 Others have similarly argued that new
models of governance are necessary to adapt to the ever-changing state of
205 Press Release, Int'l Union for Conservation of Nature, Extinction Crisis Continues
Apace (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.iucn.org/knowledge/news/?4143/
Extinction-crisis-continues-apace. The International Union for Conservation of Nature Red
List of Threatened Species (IUCN Red List) is the world's most comprehensive
information source on the global conservation status of plant and animal species. It is based
on an objective system for assessing the risk of extinction of a species should no
conservation action be taken. Id.
206 Id.
207 d
208 INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, WILDLIFE IN A CHANGING WORLD:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES (Jean-Christophe Vi6,
Craig Hilton-Taylor & Simon N. Stuart eds., 2009). The United States is ranked thirteenth
in number of threatened amphibians, nineteenth in number of threatened birds, seventh in
number of threatened mammals, and second in number of threatened conifers. Id. at 21, 27,
31, 34.
209 See Bloch, supra note 182, at 182 ("Species are the building blocks of ecosystems
and are often the most obvious indicators of an ecosystem's health." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
210 Angelo & Brown, supra note 167, at 967-68 (arguing that the incorporation of
"emergy synthesis" into environmental law "holds significant promise for transforming
environmental law").
211 Karkkainen, supra note 61, at 233-43.
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ecological understanding. 2 12 Much of this work has focused on developing
procedural laws capable of capturing the flexibility that is fundamental to adaptive
management.213 Professor Wiersema also recognizes the disconnect between
fragmented environmental laws and whole ecosystems, but she advocates staying
focused on substantive laws as the primary mechanism for achieving needed
change: "long-term environmental protection can only be achieved by these
models if we can be sure that all of the values that are at stake in environmental
protection will be adequately represented by the procedural mechanisms that these
institutions envision." 2 14 While these scholars, and others, have primarily argued
for new systems of governance that are adaptive to evolving information
concerning ecosystems, there is a body of scholarship more specifically devoted to
the protection of ecosystem services through common law doctrines.2 15
From this wealth of scholarship and our examination of substantive
environmental laws, we can properly draw two conclusions. First, regulating parts
of nature instead of .nature as a whole is well understood to be an incomplete
approach to environmental and natural resource regulation. Second, despite the fact
that scientists, federal agencies, lawmakers, and scholars have long been aware of
the need to manage ecosystems on a more holistic basis, there is still a gap in
regulation, sparking a need for substantive laws expressly aimed at protecting
ecosystems and the important services that they provide.
C. Limitations of the Common Law
The increased mainstream attention that ecological services have been
receiving from ecologists, economists, and government agencies since the
publication of Nature's Services in 1997 has led to a corresponding explosion of
legal scholarship exploring how to synthesize environmental laws with ecological
understanding. 2 16 For the most part, this scholarship has grappled with two main
issues. First, the ability of existing legal doctrines to utilize the economic value
associated with ecological services. 2 17 Second, the valuation of ecological services
and the creation of markets to capture that value.2 18
212 Wiersema, supra note 168, at 1242-44 & nn.7-22 (surveying scholarship that
urges the adoption of new governance models rooted in procedural law).
213 Id. For a detailed discussion and critique of adaptive management, see Holly
Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1455 (2011).
214 Wiersema, supra note 168, at 1244.
215 See infra Part II.C.
216 In the last ten years, over 450 law review articles referencing ecological services
have been published, 75 with "ecological services" or "ecosystem services" appearing
somewhere in the title or summary.
217 See, e.g., infra notes 219-230 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887
(1997) (approaching ecological services from the perspective of valuation issues);
Salzman, supra note 74, at 133-34 (tackling the issue of how to create ecosystem services
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Among the most prominent and prolific writers in this field is Professor J.B.
Ruhl. Most recently, Professor Ruhl's work has focused on the common law
nuisance doctrine and its ability to provide a remedy for economic injuries to
ecological services. 2 19 Ruhl argues that the birth of ecological economics and
understanding of ecology create a legal system that is ripe for revisiting nuisance
doctrine as a tool for remedying harms to ecological services.2 20 He explains that
using the nuisance doctrine to address these harms was made possible by the
Supreme Court's decision Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.22 1 In that
case, Justice Scalia carved out an exception for regulatory takings when the
challenged restrictions merely reflect those already imposed by common law
nuisance or other "background principles" of property law.222 In explaining this
exception, Scalia noted that common law evolves as new knowledge emerges.2 23
According to Ruhl, this recognition provides the opening for nuisance law to
address new knowledge regarding the value of ecological services.224
Perhaps because its roots lie in capitalizing on Lucas, Ruhl's argument for
pressing the nuisance doctrine into service is limited to cases where ecological
injuries contain identifiable economic values.225 His is a self-described
"instrumentalist" approach based on "welfare economics."2 26 He recognizes that
there are moral, ethical, or scientific arguments on behalf of ecological integrity,
markets such that the valuation of these services can play a role in environmental laws);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
261 (2000) (discussing regulatory markets, public goods markets, and ecosystem services
markets).
219 See J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753 (2008)
[hereinafter Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological]; J.B. Ruhl, Toward a Common Law of
Ecosystem Services, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2005); J. B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and
the Common Law of "The Fragile Land System," 20 NAT. RES. & ENv'T, Fall 2005, at 3
[hereinafter Ruhl, Ecosystem Services]; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029 (1992).
220 Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 219, at 756-58.
221 Id. at 759; see also J.B. Ruhl, The "Background Principles" of Natural Capital
and Ecosystem Services: Did Lucas Open Pandora's Box?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
525, 536-40 (2007).
222 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
223 Id. at 1031.
224 Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 219, at 758-60; Ruhl, supra note
221, at 536-40. Though Ruhl contends that his arguments are not motivated by takings
avoidance, his arguments are nonetheless premised on the openings left by the Supreme
Court in Lucas, and his pragmatic approach to the use of nuisance law for addressing harms
to ecological services suggests that takings avoidance must play a role in the development
of his legal theories. Cf James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of the Common
Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 813-14 (2008) (criticizing Ruhl and other scholars for
embracing the common law after Lucas as a takings avoidance strategy).
225 Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 219, at 760.
226 id.
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but decides to take a pragmatic approach by trying to protect ecosystem services
within the playing fields already established-namely market-valuation and
common law doctrines that recognize economic injury:
I am not suggesting that nuisance law take on the whole of ecosystem
management law . . . . Rather, what I have in mind looks and feels like a
rather conventional nuisance action, the only novel feature being that the
plaintiff is linking damage to ecological resources on defendant's
227property with injury to use and enjoyment of plaintiffs property.
Ruhl also recognizes the limits of this approach and its ability to fully protect
ecological services. With respect to private nuisance doctrine, he acknowledges
that
it cannot be that all losses of ecosystem services have a remedy in
nuisance. Indeed, what I have outlined as an ecosystem service nuisance
is intended to fit within the conventional doctrine of private nuisance, not
to morph it into a general ecological protection regime. In the absence of
a plaintiff whose use and enjoyment of property is substantially injured
as a result of another landowner's degradation of natural capital, no
ecosystem service nuisance has been committed.2 28
Ruhl, in other words, offers nuisance doctrine as a tool for remedying only the
most traditional and narrow category of ecological harms.229
Other scholars have more aggressively argued that common law doctrines can
remedy broader categories of ecological nuisances. Professor John Copeland
Nagle, for example, would take Ruhl's argument a bit further.2 3 0 Using the
destruction of wetlands as an example of ecological nuisances, Nagle argues that
we should move beyond the traditional role of nuisance law in protecting economic
interest; he argues that environmental ethics should inform which actions give rise
to ecological nuisance claims.2 31
By thinking beyond economics, Nagle gets closer to recognizing the breadth
and depth of the problem at hand. Ethics and broader considerations of what
constitutes good land use are part of any environmental regulatory decision,
whether so acknowledged or not.232 In other words, we can hardly decide on a
satisfactory point of environmental regulation without making a value judgment
227 Id. at 777.
228 Id. at 774-75.
229 See id.; see also, e.g., Anderson, supra note 92, at 551; Goldstein, supra note 12, at
347; Wilgus, supra note 11, at 99.
230 Nagle, supra note 31, at 787-88.
231 Id. at 802-11.
232 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 16, at 144-46.
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about acceptable tradeoffs between interests of the private and the public-for
example, private economic interests and public health, or private property rights
and public resources. Given the importance of land health and ecological services
to human welfare, economic valuation is not an acceptable proxy for the
worthiness of protecting us from ourselves.2 33
If Nagle picks up where Ruhl left off, this Article picks up where Nagle left
off. While both Ruhl and Nagle looked to common law as an avenue for
remedying harms to ecological services, both agreed that the common law, though
informative and the only tool that appears readily available, does not offer a broad
or comprehensive enough solution. In his work on illustrating ecological nuisance
through wetlands regulation, Nagle commented, "individualized assessment
provided by nuisance law is not a panacea for wetlands regulation. Ethical norms
are more readily incorporated into statutory provisions that are crafted with
particular goals in mind." 2 34 Ruhl made a similar observation when he expressed
skepticism that the common law could accommodate the underlying ethical and
moral considerations in an ecological context.2 35 In the end, this limitation of the
common law appears to have driven his preference for tempting the law's
"instrumentalist core" with economics of natural capital.236
Other scholars have more strongly criticized the common law's ability to
serve as the foundation for ecosystem protection. Professor James Huffman objects
to the creation of ecological nuisances through common law because it would
allow courts, and not the legislature, to set environmental policy.2 3 7 Huffman is
also critical of arguments advanced by Ruhl and others because he sees those
arguments merely as attempts to avoid regulatory takings through common law
doctrines.238
While Huffman's suggestion that the common law has no useful role in
shaping a new law of ecosystem protection is likely overstated, he aptly observes
that the challenge before us requires a broader, coordinated approach. The
common law provides the foundation for modem environmental pollution control
laws and is "profoundly adaptive." 239 But it is also a slowly churning machine,
processing one individual dispute at a time, eventually turning out a by-product of
233 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 46, 8-9.
234 Nagle, supra note 31, at 811.
235 Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, supra note 219 at 784-85.
2361cl. at 785.
237 Huffman, supra note 224, at 813-14.
238 Id. at 813 ("But for the most part the fledgling environmental case for revival of
common law remedies is rooted in a belief that a reinvigorated common law will further
weaken constitutional protections of property rights that might otherwise stand in the way
of command and control regulation.").
239 Ruhl, Ecosystem Services, supra note 219, at 8 ("Almost a century ago the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907),
suggested that the common law could play an important and innovative role in pollution
control.").
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policy that is many cases and years in the making. Because of this, the common
law is widely recognized as a "grossly inadequate" tool for providing a broad and
effective policy of pollution control.240
Nearly three decades ago, Professor Richard Lazarus wrote of another
common law doctrine-the public trust doctrine-and criticized its use as
impeding the necessary evolution of natural resources law. 24 1 Similar to Ruhl's
invocation of the nuisance doctrine to protect ecosystem services, Lazarus
explained how the public trust doctrine was invoked to impose limits on the
privatization of natural resources. 24 2 Though he agreed that limits were necessary,
Lazarus criticized the public trust doctrine's application as a legal fiction, arguing
that natural resource laws needed to reflect modem ecological concerns and that
clinging to old doctrines simply resulted in "tortured constructions of the present
rather than repudiations of the doctrine's past."243 In addition, Lazarus cautioned
against an overreliance on the public trust doctrine to address natural resource
concerns because it was a product of judge-made law.244 In that way, the doctrine
depended on a judiciary with a proenvironment bias to achieve sought-after results
of natural resource protection. Though Lazarus spoke of a different time, both in
terms of ecological understanding and regulatory takings law, some of Lazarus's
criticisms hold true today as nuisance law is advanced to protect ecosystem
services and to set limits on private landowners' misuse of such services.
Though the common law is a flexible tool that achieves legitimacy through its
case-by-case embodiment of evolving public values, 24 5 such a slow-moving,
piecemeal approach is not responsive enough to the pace at which landscapes are
altered and ecological services are destroyed. This is not to say that common law
doctrines are inconsistent with these proposals, or that some of the proposals have
not been embraced historically by the common law. But there are many layers of
change that would need to take place in current thinking before the common law
240 Id. at 5 (citing ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 72 (4th
ed. 2003); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970) ("A court
should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private litigation and it seems
manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any
judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for
the elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of one private
lawsuit.")).
241 See Lazarus, supra note 142, at 631-33.242 Id. at 632-33.
2431 d. at 711.
244 Id. at 712-13.
245 See Ruhl, Ecosystem Services, supra note 219, at 6 ("Most comprehensive
treatments of the evolution of environmental law begin with the common law as the first
meaningful stage of development.... The common law [] provided much-need legitimacy
to the public law agenda for pollution control."); see also id. at 7 (arguing that ecosystem
management law has gained little traction because "ecosystem management legislation
tried to leapfrog its common law formative stage").
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could uniformly embrace new ecological understanding and heal the schism
between responsible land use on public and private land. Doing so in a timely
fashion asks too much of the common law.
Like Lazarus's criticism of reliance on the public trust doctrine as a panacea,
it is dangerous to put too much stock in the ability of nuisance law to reshape
remedies for the misuse of private lands that harbor valuable ecosystem services.
Such an evolution is not only slow, but it is also dependent on a judiciary being
willing to recognize new ecological concerns, and it does not necessarily strike at
the heart of some of the more nettlesome issues underlying ecosystem protection.
Given the limitations of the common law, a more explicit and broad-based
approach is needed in order to remedy harms to ecosystems. A rethinking and
expansion of natural resource damages law is one such approach.
III. THE PROMISE OF A REMEDY IN NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES LAW
Before discussing how an expansion of natural resource damages law might
be reformed, a recap of the major arguments made so far might be useful at this
point. First, we ought not misuse nature, though where we draw the line between
use and misuse has yet to be determined.24 6 Second, our understanding of nature
has matured through the study of ecology, and we now have a greater appreciation
for the valuable services that ecosystems provide to society. 247 Third, we need to
broaden our notions of public ownership and assert control over parts and
processes of nature that were once deemed worthless but are now understood as
valuable.2 48 Finally, the multitude of environmental laws currently in effect do not
protect nature as an interconnected whole. 249 It is time to put behind us the
language of nature as separable elements and talk about the disruption of nature's
vital functional processes.
Putting all these pieces together, the key claim is that we ought to consider a
new, broader, more ecologically and ethically informed understanding of "natural
resource damages." More specifically, if we combine a concept of natural
resources that recognizes ecosystem services; the foundation of natural resource
damages law as it exists today; the normative claim that we ought not misuse
nature; and a more complete acceptance of public ownership of nature, then we can
begin to conceive of a new natural resource damages law that provides a remedy
for the misuse of nature.
This Part explores the promise and limitations of expanding natural resource
damages law. Part IV then sketches the ways in which we might craft causes of
action, provide remedies, and empower citizens through a reformed natural
246 See supra Part I.A.
247 See supra Part I.B. L.
248 See supra Part I.B.2.
249 See supra Part II.B-C.
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resource damages framework. Enumerating the challenges ahead will set the stage
for a longer and more detailed discussion in the future.
A. The Promise ofNatural Resource Damages Law
Natural resource damages law is a promising starting point for developing a
framework for remedying misuse of nature. Key features of its framework include
a broad definition of natural resources, the use of nontraditional economic
methods, and treatment of natural resources as part of the public trust.
By way of background, federal statutory authority for natural resource
damages originated in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act. 2 50 Today,
authority is contained primarily in five federal statutes,25' including section 107 of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERLCA); 252 section 311(f)(4) of the Clean Water Act (CWA); 253 section 1002 of
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA); 254 the Marine Protection Research and
Sanctuary Act;255 and the National Park System Resource Protection Act. 2 56
250 Technically, the natural resource damages concept was first used in the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 and was also addressed in the Deepwater Porter
Act of 1974. The Clean Water Act, however, brought the concept into significant light by
applying it beyond particular, designated resources. Manus, supra note 13, at 424.
251 Of these federal statutes, CERLCA is perhaps the most well known and largest
source of natural resource damage recovery actions. The attributes of CERLCA's natural
resource damages provisions will, therefore, serve as the primary stepping stone for
discussion of natural resource damages potential and limitations here. Many states have
similarly enacted state superfund statutes that include provisions for recovery of natural
resource damages. E.g., Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M. Ward, Natural Resource
Damages: Recovery Under State Law Compared with Federal Laws, 20 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,
134 (1990) (reviewing existing state laws establishing liability for natural resource
damages). For example, the New Jersey Spill Act authorizes natural resource damage
recovery for discharges of hazardous substances. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 1(g)(c)
(West 2006). A detailed analysis of state natural resource damages laws and their potential
to inform a new framework for remedying the misuse of nature is a separate undertaking.
This Article examines the promise and limits of natural resource damages as conceived in
key federal statutes.
252 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006) (providing that a "trustee" may recover for injury to,
destruction, or loss of natural resources, including reasonable cost of assessment, resulting
from the release of hazardous substances).
253 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (2006) (providing that "costs of removal of oil or a
hazardous substance" recoverable under the statute include any cost or expenses incurred
by federal or state government in the restoration or replacement of natural resources
damaged or destroyed "as a result of a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance").
254 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing recovery of "removal costs and damages" that
result from discharges of oil into navigable waters or the adjoining shoreline, including
recovery by a trustee for damages for injury to natural resources). OPA was enacted in
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., et al., The Exxon
REMEDYING THE MISUSE OF NATURE
In general, these statutes create liability for injury to, or destruction or loss of,
natural resources.2 57 CERLCA and OPA define natural resources to include "land,
fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other
such resources" that are managed or otherwise controlled by the United States.2 5 8
"Injury" is also broadly defined to include nearly any adverse impact on a
resource.259
CERLCA's broad definition of natural resources reflects a willingness to
move beyond the traditional treatment of natural resources as discrete segments of
nature and recognize that ecosystems and their services are part of natural
resources. To that end, the Department of Interior's (DOI) damage assessment
regulations advise trustees to quantify injuries to natural resources as well as "lost
services."26 0 Similarly, in the event that trustees must consider acquisition of
resource equivalents in lieu of restoration, the DOI requires trustees to consider the
"services" provided by the resources. Trustees are instructed not to treat services as
commodities that can be restored independently of the resource:
[DOI] does not believe that Congress intended to allow trustee agencies
to simply restore the abstract services provided by a resource, which
could conceivably be done through an artificial mechanism. For
example, nothing in . . . CERLCA suggests that replacement of a spring
with a water pipeline would constitute 'restoration, rehabilitation,
replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent resources.' 261
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) regulations
similarly recognize the need to rehabilitate ecological services. Those regulations
provide that, where the injury has resulted in the loss of ecological services,
Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources Damage Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22
ALASKA L. REv. 135, 141 (2005).
255 16 U.S.C. § 1443 (2006) (holding any person responsible for injuring sanctuary
resources liable for the cost of "damages resulting from the destruction loss or injury.")
256 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1 (2006) ("[A]ny person who destroys, causes the loss of, or
injures any park system resource is liable to the United States for response costs and
damages resulting from such destruction, loss, or injury.").
257 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A).
258 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16); 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20).
259 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(v) (2010) (DOI regulations defining injury as "a measurable
adverse change, either long- or short-term, in the chemical or physical quality or the
viability of a natural resource . . ."); 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2011) (NOAA regulations
providing a similarly broad definition).
260 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1) ("The compensable value can include the economic value
of lost services provided by the injured resources, including both public use and nonuse
values such as existence and bequest values.").
261 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,328, 39,340 (proposed
July 22, 1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11).
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trustees must consider using Habitat Equivalency Analysis 262 and similar "resource
to resource" and "service to service" approaches to restoration.263 Because natural
resource damages law already takes a more holistic view of natural resources, as
opposed to considering them as discrete and separable elements of nature, it could
provide the foundation that is needed to remedy misuses of nature more generally.
The second key feature of natural resource damages is the willingness of
Congress and courts to accept nontraditional methods of valuing natural resource
injuries. Instead of holding natural resource damages captive to traditional market
valuations, CERLCA requires damage assessment regulations to "identify the best
available procedures to determine such damages, including both direct and indirect
injury, destruction, and loss.. .. " CERCLA further provides that the relevant
factors for assessing natural resource damages will include "replacement value, use
value, and [the] ability of the ecosystem to recover.... "265
In Ohio v. U.S. Department of Interior,266 the leading case interpreting natural
resource damage valuation under CERCLA, the D.C. Circuit held that "Congress
intended the damage assessment regulations to capture fully all aspects ofloss."2 67
This means that damages are measured, at a minimum, by the cost of restoring the
damaged natural resources to their preinjured condition. In some cases, where
restoration is not feasible, replacing the injured resource becomes the focal point of
the damages assessment.
Even if full restoration is feasible, the public may suffer a loss of enjoyment
of the resource while it is injured. In these situations, damages may also include
the lost use and nonuse values. 26 8 Lost use values are measured by the benefits
derived from current or expected future uses of the resource by identifiable
persons; "use values are the more market-translatable values of a natural resource,
encompassing both consumptive uses, such as hunting and fishing, in which
262 Habitat Equivalency Analysis is a method for assessing resource injuries. Itzchak
E. Kornfeld, Of Dead Pelicans, Turtles, and Marshes: Natural Resource Damages in the
Wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 317, 330 (2011)
("The principal concept underlying [Habitat Equivalency Analysis] is that the public can be
compensated for past losses of habitat resources through habitat replacement projects
providing additional resources of the same type.").
263 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d).
264 42 U.S.C. § 965 1(c)(2)(B) (2006). Indirect injuries include those that result from
the implementation of reniediation, such as the destruction of a wetland through the
dredging of contaminated sediment. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.15(a)(3)(ii).
265 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2)(B); see also 43 C.F.R. § 11.80(b) (DOI regulations setting
forth two components of natural resource damage claims, including (a) a claim for monies
required to restore, replace, or acquire an equivalent of the injured natural resource; and (b)
a claim for the lost compensable value of the resource).
266 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
267 Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
268 Id. at 463; see id at 454 n.34, 464, 476-78; see also id at 462-63 ("From the bald
eagle to the blue whale and the snail darter, natural resources have values that are not fully
captured by the market system.").
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resources are harvested, and nonconsumptive uses, such as hiking and bird
watching, in which the activity does not reduce the stock or resources." 26 9 Nonuse,
or passive use, values are benefits that people derive from knowing that certain
resources exist and could be used in the future.2 7 0
It is the inclusion of nonuse values in the damage assessment that underscores
the desire to ensure the full measure of harm is remedied through natural resource
damages law. For example, in Utah v. Kennecolt Corporation,27 1 the district court
rejected the state trustee's damage assessment for groundwater contamination
because it was based solely on the market value of the volume of water lost to the
public. 2 72 The court concluded that the trustee "adopted a too narrow interpretation
of use value by equating such with market value only. . . . [It] failed to assess the
non-consumptive use values of the aquifer, i.e., option and existence values."273
Other courts have similarly recognized the need to include nonuse values into
the natural resource damage assessment equation and upheld nontraditional
methods of valuation. In Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior,2 74 the D.C.
Circuit explained that "[o]ption and existence values may represent 'passive' use,
but they nonetheless reflect utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus,
prima facie, ought to be included in a damage assessment."275 Contingent
valuation,276 a particularly controversial method for assessing nonuse values, has
even been upheld as a valid method for valuing natural resource damages.277 In
addition, at least one court has upheld Habitat Equivalency Analysis2 78 as an
appropriate method for valuing ecosystem damages.27 9
269 Manus, supra note 13, at 447.
270 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,263 (Mar. 25,
1994) (codified in 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (explaining nonuse values in the preamble to the final
rule in response to Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior).
271 801 F. Supp. 553 (D. Utah 1992).
272Id. at 571.
273 Id.
274 880 F.2d 432.
275 Id. at 464; see also Idaho v. S. Refrigerated Transp., No. 88-1279, 1991 WL
22479, at *18 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 1991) (holding that commercial, existence, and recreation
values all "exist and would be appropriate items of damage if proved at trial").
276 For an explanation of the contingent valuation methodology and why it is
controversial, see Miriam Montesinos, Comment, It May Be Silly, But It's an Answer: The
Need to Accept Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 48 (1999).
277 Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 476-78 (upholding as consistent with
congressional intent DOI's endorsement of the use of contingent valuation methodology to
measure use, existence, and option values); see also Manus, supra note 13, at 446-49
(providing an overview of contingent valuation method and observing that much of the
debate surrounding natural resource damage valuation has centered on that method).
278 For a description of Habitat Equivalency Analysis, see supra note 266.
279 United States v. Fisher, 977 F. Supp. 1193, 1198-1200 (S.D. Fla. 1997), aff'd, 174
F.3d 201 (11th Cir. 1999). Similarly, the natural resource damage regulations adopted by
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The effort of natural resource damages to compensate losses that range from
purely economic to nonutilitarian underscores its broad-based conception of
natural resources and recognition of resources beyond their strict market valuation.
In fact, the effort to reflect nonutilitarian losses to humans has been described as
"the most poetic and profound element" of natural resource damages law. 2 80
In addition to its expansive definition of natural resources and willingness to
accept nontraditional economic methods of valuing harms, another critical attribute
of natural resource damages law is its inherent recognition that natural resources
are part of the public trust. There are several basic natural resource damage
provisions that frame the public trust character of natural resources. First, both
CERCLA and OPA limit the pursuit of natural resource damages to federal, state,
or tribal trustees. 2 81 These trustees are charged with acting "on behalf of the public
. . . as trustees of natural resources.. .. 282 Second, natural resources are defined
to include "other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by,
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by" federal, state, and tribal
governments.283 Finally, trustees are allowed to use natural resource damages
recoveries "only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of' the affected
resources.284 Recovered monies, in other words, must actually be used to directly
benefit the public; trustees cannot simply place natural resource damage recoveries
into their general revenue funds.
Several scholars have recognized the benefits of incorporating the public trust
model into natural resource damages law. Professor Manus, for instance, explains
that
the incorporation of the public trust model into the [natural resource
damage] provisions of several major statutes may represent a positive
NOAA require the consideration of habitat equivalency analysis and similar "resource to
resource" and "service to service" approaches for scaling restoration when the injury has
resulted in the loss of ecological services. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d) (2011). Habitat
equivalency analysis attempts to compensate loss of habitat resources through habitat
replacement projects that provide resources of the same type. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, NOAA, HABITAT EQUIVALENCY ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (revised ed.
2006), available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/heaoverv.pdf. For an example of
habitat equivalency analysis, see Notice of Environmental Assessment for United
Heckathorn Superfund Site, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,815, 10,816-18 (Feb. 29, 2000).
280 Manus, supra note 13, at 446.
281 Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (2006); Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2006).
282 Oil Pollution Act § 2706(b); Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation, and Liability Act § 9607(f)(1).
283 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) (2006) (emphasis added); Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act § 9601(16) (emphasis added).
284 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act
§ 9607(f)(1).
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reminder to government officials, particularly those in the agriculture,
forestry, and other environmentally related agencies, that overriding all
of their individual actions and decisions is an obligation to present and
future generations to prevent an irrevocable imbalance in nature."285
In this spirit, The National Association of Attorneys General has emphasized
the importance of the trust relationship in natural resource damages law:
[t]he states and the Federal Governments [sic] are trustees for the people,
and . . . their trust corpus includes this nation's glorious natural
resources. We, as trustees, have an obligation to protect these often
irreplaceable resources from harm, and those that harm them have the
obligation to restore them for all the people.286
The public trust aspect of natural resource damages law underscores the
promise that the law holds in serving as the foundation for developing remedies for
misuses of nature more generally. If we recognize that a broad range of natural
resources and ecosystem services are part of the public trust, we can better accept
more fundamental principles such as the notion that we should not misuse nature
and that maintaining strict boundaries between public and private property is
unrealistic.
B.. The Limits ofNatural Resource Damages Law
Given these three attributes-broad definition of natural resources,
nontraditional means of valuing injuries to natural resources, and recognition of
natural resources as public trust-natural resource damages seem to be a logical
starting place from which to build a more comprehensive approach to remedying
misuses of nature. To that end, it is useful to understand its current dimensions and
limitations. In general, natural resource damages law suffers from limitations of
scope, accessibility, and process.
Instead of being universally available to redress harms to natural resources,
they are only available in particular situations that serve the purpose of the statutes
285 Manus, supra note 13, at 435-36; see also Thomas L. Eggert & Kathleen A.
Chorostecki, Rusty Trustees and the Lost Pots of Gold: Natural Resource Damage Trustee
Coordination Under the Oil Pollution Act, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 291, 292-99 (1993)
(discussing the trust attributes of OPA and their connection to the public trust doctrine);
Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: Whose Side Are They Really
On?, 5 ENVTL. L. 407, 423 (1999) ("[Natural Resource Damage] trustees do indeed have a
fiduciary duty to protect and restore the public's resources, as well as to refrain from
abusing their power in carrying out their responsibilities.").
286 Superfund Reform and Reauthorization: Hearing on S. 8 Before the S. Comm. on
Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 119 (1998) (statement of Gordon J. Johnson, Assistant
Att'y Gen. of New York); see also Murray, supra note 285, at 422-23.
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in which they are housed. In this way, natural resource damages are limited in
scope and embody the same fragmentation that plagues environmental law more
generally. 2 87 For example, natural resource damages are only available under
CERLCA when there has been a release of hazardous substances into the
environment. 28 8 Likewise, under OPA and the CWA, a release of oil into navigable
waters is required to trigger liability for natural resource damages.289 Other, less
prominent statutes containing natural resource damage provisions-for example,
the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuary Act-suffer from similarly narrow
applications by limiting natural resource damages to very specific categories of
federal lands.290
Not only are natural resource damages limited to certain types of releases or
harms, but they are also limited to resources "belonging to, managed by, held in
trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by" federal, state, or tribal
governments.2 91 While this definition does not actually require federal or state
governments to own the natural resources, it does exclude purely private property
from the scope of natural resource damages.292 Given that private property
constituted over sixty percent of the land in the United States,293 excluding this
land from the purview of natural resource damages is a significant limitation to any
framework seeking a comprehensive remedy for the misuse of nature.294
In addition to their limited scope, natural resource damages are also limited in
their accessibility. As described above, only authorized trustees are permitted to
pursue natural resource damage recoveries.2 95 This means that private plaintiffs
seeking to recover damages for injuries caused by harm to the environment-for
example, the private landowners or commercial fishermen plaintiffs in the Exxon
Valdez oil spill litigation-could not unilaterally avail themselves of CERCLA or
287 See supra Part II.B.
288 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (f).
289 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f).
290 The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuary Act limits natural resource damage
recovery to harm caused to National Marine Sanctuary resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1443 (2006).
Similarly, the Park System Resources Protection Act limits natural resource damages to
harm to National Park resources. 16 U.S.C. § 19jj (2006).
291 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act §
9601(16) (definition of natural resources).
292 Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding
that Congress deliberately excluded purely private property from the definition of natural
resources).
293 ECON. RESEARCH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, 2002/EIB-14, MAJOR
USES OF LAND, BY CLASS OF OWNERSHIP 1 (2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/EIB 14/eib 14j.pdf.
294 See supra Part I.B.
295 See supra notes 260-286 and accompanying text; see also 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1);
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
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OPA's natural resource damage provisions. Local governments and private parties
have to rely on the relief provided under state or common law.296
Foreclosing private citizens from pursuing natural resource damages places
the burden of pursuing natural resource damages solely in the hands of agencies
with limited time and funding. Without suggesting that natural resource damage
recoveries be awarded to private citizens, it is possible that individuals could step
into the shoes of trustees through citizen suit-type provisions. In environmental
laws generally, citizen suit provisions have been a significant force behind the
successful enforcement and interpretation of important statutes such as the Clean
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act. 297 A similar
concept could make natural resource damages a more effective remedial tool as
well.
The third major limitation of natural resource damages law is its limitation of
process; even if federal natural resource damages were more widely available in
scope and accessibility, the costs, controversy, and delay associated with assessing
and valuing natural resource injuries have limited their usefulness in practice.2 98
In order to support a claim for natural resource damages, for instance, trustees
typically prepare a natural resource damage assessment.299 While not mandated by
regulation, a natural resource damages assessment is a key component of proving
the extent of damages to which trustees are entitled. 3 00 To that end, CERLCA
creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of damages assessed according to
296 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (CERLCA does not modify remedies available under the
common law).
297 Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131,
1187-90 (2009) (discussing the significance of citizen suit provisions in federal
environmental law and explaining that the first such provision, contained in the Clean Air
Act of 1970, "imagined citizens as both private enforcers of existing EPA dictates as well
as direct watchdogs on EPA activities").
298 "The measurement of damages, however, is one of the most controversial aspects
of a natural resources damage action." Gerald F. George, Litigation of Claims For Natural
Resource Damages, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 399, 410 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Court of
Study Materials, June 26-30, 2000). "In most instances, these determinations as well as the
scaling of the restoration or compensation activities, will require data and assumptions
about ecological services, injury, recovery and productivity rates that are much easier to
describe than to develop in practice." Id at 412.
299 For a discussion of Natural Resource Damage Assessments and the rebuttable
presumptions afforded to those Assessments, see Yen P. Hoang, Note, Assessing
Environmental Damages After Oil Spill Disasters: How Courts Should Construe the
Rebuttable Presumption Under the Oil Pollution Act, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1469 (2011).
300 See generally Craig R. O'Connor, Natural Resource Damages Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, in
ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT MATTERS: ADVANCED CIVIL LITIGATION (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study Materials February, 18, 1999) (noting that the defensibility of a
natural resource damages assessment in court is "vital to the ability of the trustees' legal
representatives to recover the funds necessary to restore injured resources").
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regulatory procedures.3 01 Without that presumption, the trustees face the
unenviable task of attempting to prove that a particular person caused the harms
identified in the natural resource damage claim and that the cost of those harms is
properly valued;3 0 2 without the benefit of a rebuttable presumption, CERCLA
places the burden of proving and valuing ecological injuries on the trustee.30 3
Given the complexity, dynamism, and interconnectedness of natural systems, the
task of identifying, let alone valuing, natural resource injuries can be a substantial
and formidable undertaking. 30 4 Because trustees face a "'significant proof
obstacle" 305 in the identification and valuation of natural resource damages, these
assessments are, as a practical matter, indispensable for trustees seeking to avoid
challenge and costly litigation by potentially responsible parties.
But natural resource damage assessments are "costly propositions," 306 and the
prospect of undertaking theses costs puts pursuit of natural resource damages out
30 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(c) (2006).
302 Even with the presumption, the task of proving and valuing damages is difficult. In
fact, the D.C. Court of Appeals has observed that the presumption does not appear to have
created the "powerful advantage" as originally envisioned, but rather has amounted to
"nothing more than a burden shifting exercise." Gen. Elec. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 128
F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
303 Professor Manus posits that Congress's allocation of the burden of proving
liability for natural resource damages on trustees is "[p]erhaps the most telling sign of
congressional reticence to allow ready implementation of the ultimate goals of [natural
resource damages]." Manus, supra note 13, at 440.
3 For a discussion of the complex, dynamic, and uncertain attributes of the
environment that, in turn, impact environmental laws, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16-24 (2004); see also Sanne H. Knudsen, A
Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 (2009); Wiersema, supra note 168, at 1246-48; Karkkainen, supra
note 61, at 194-97.
305 Manus, supra note 13, at 442-43 ("[T]he requirement that trustees prove injury
could eviscerate the [natural resource damages] claim from within, because in the web of
life no ecological change occurs in the sterile isolation required for proof of causation.").
306 New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1242 n.28 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[The
court is] well aware that NRD assessment is a costly proposition."). In this case, the Tenth
Circuit went on to explain that
[a]ccording to two commentators, after its 1986 amendments, CERCLA 'cast
trustees adrift to finance their own damage assessment before filing claims
against polluters-a costly proposition, given that damage assessments typically
cost millions of dollars. This lack of funding has created a virtually
insurmountable obstacle considering that agency budgets have historically
authorized little or no funding for NRD assessments.'
Id. (citing Gina M. Lambert & Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA 's Natural
Resource Damages Provision: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine into Natural
Resource Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 353, 371-72 (1992)).
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of reach for some state and federal trusteeS. 307 Although polluters are ultimately
responsible for reimbursing the trustees for the cost of the assessment for
successful claims, the time and expense of conducting such an assessment is more
than the budgets of many trustees can bear in the first instance. 308
Moreover, the inherently complex nature of delineating natural resource
injuries turns the preparation of natural resource damage assessments into a long
and arduous process. As NOAA explains:
Although the concept of assessing injuries may sound simple,
understanding complex ecosystems, the services these ecosystems
provide, and the injuries caused by oil and hazardous substances takes
time-often years. The season the resource was injured, the type of oil or
hazardous substance, and the amount and duration of the release are
among the factors that affect how quickly resources are assessed and
restoration and recovery occurs. The rigorous scientific studies that are
necessary to prove injury to resources and services-and withstand
scrutiny in a court of law-may also take years to implement and
complete.309
This means that the time between the event that gives rise to the injury and the
settlement of the natural resource damages can take decades in some cases.3lo A
2004 study of state trustees involved in natural resource damage cases found that
the average length of time between event and settlement is eleven years. 3 11 This
307 Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: Failures,
Lessons Learned, and Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REv. 409, 447-48 (2008) ("Natural
resource trustees are generally understaffed and under-funded.").
308 Id. Some states, like New Jersey and California, have devised relatively successful
natural resource damage programs because they have made funding available for damage
assessments up front. Id. at 438-44 (discussing the New Jersey approach to natural
resource damages). In addition, these states have also been successful at reducing the cost
of assessments by enacting regulations that approve certain simplified methodologies. Id. at
445. Those simplified methodologies, however, are nonetheless vulnerable to legal
challenge absent any presumption in favor of the trustee if methodologies are followed. Id.
309 Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Ass'n, Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA) Process: About DARRP, NOAA's DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REMEDIATION &
RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/about/nrda.html (last updated July,
19, 2010); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, Frequently Asked Questions, NAT.
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.doi.gov/
restoration/about/faqs.cfTm (last visited Mar. 24, 2102) ("Damage assessments are often
quite complex and often take years to complete.").
310 AMY W. ANDO ET AL., ILL. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, RESEARCH REPORT No.
108, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: METHODS AND CASES 12 (2004),
available at http://www.wmrc.uiuc.edu/main sections/info services/librarydocs/RR/RR-
108.pdf.
311 id.
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finding is consistent with the conclusions of a federal advisory committee report
released in 2007 that found the federal natural resource damages process needs to
be revised in order to make restoration of natural resources "faster, more efficient,
and more effective."3 12 To that end, the advisory committee's recommendations
were aimed, in part, at establishing cooperative relationships with potentially
responsible parties in order to: (1) encourage responsible parties to fund damage
assessments in the first instance; and (2) avoid valuation issues by encouraging
responsible parties to conduct the restoration activities. 3 Until natural resource
damage processes and methodologies can be revised to facilitate effective recovery
of public costs to natural resources, they will most likely continue to be
underutilized and only be successful in the unusual case.
312 NAT. RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION FED. ADVISORY COMM.,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY 20 (2007), available at
http://www.doi.gov/restoration/library/upload/faca finalreport.pdf; see also Peck, supra
note 156, at 275-77, 304-05 (arguing for revisions to natural resources damages laws);
Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts' Struggles with Natural Resource
Damages, 32 ENvTL. L. 57, 60-61 (2002) (arguing for the amendment of NRD regulations
to provide a more simplified approach); Tolan, supra note 307, at 450-53 (arguing for
revision of federal natural resource damages program).
313 On this latter point, one of the most hotly contested issues in natural resource
damage claims is valuation. See, e.g., Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use
Damages in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 417, 448 (2005)
(citing Richard Stewart et al., Evaluating the Present Natural Resource Damages Regime:
The Lawyer's Perspective, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLICY ANALYSIS 163 (Richard Stewart ed., 1995) ("[M]easuring natural resource
damages is 'the most daunting task facing trustees."'); James L. Nicoll, Environmental
Restoration: Challenges for the New Millennium: The Irrationality of Economic
Rationality in the Restoration of Natural Resources, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 463, 464 (2000)
(challenging traditional economic theory in the valuation of natural resources); Thompson,
supra note 312, at 60 ("Natural resource damages present a significant challenge for the
legal system because in most cases they are non-market commodities."). How do we
effectively measure the loss of, or injury to, certain resources? One approach is by
measuring the use and existence value of the resource from a utilitarian perspective, for
example, the worth of the resource measured by its value to individuals or society. See
Peck, supra note 156, at 279-82. Another approach-the biocentric approach-would
measure the intrinsic value of the resource independent of human satisfactions. Id. Not
surprisingly, the preferred method of valuing natural resources is to quantify utilitarian
values of use and existence through some method of cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 281-82.
Three of the most common methods for measuring the value of natural resource damages
are market valuation, restoration and replacement cost, and contingent valuation. Id. at
282-85. Regardless of the chosen method, however, controversies will certainly arise given
that natural resource damages are unique in many instances and their uses not readily
subject to valuation.
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IV. SKETCHES OF A REFORMED LAW
Unlike existing laws that tend to protect private owners against damage by
others,314 the reforms proposed in this Article would draw upon and expand on
laws that protect parts of nature from damage by the owner itself. Anticruelty laws
represent one area where society has deemed it necessary and ethical to protect the
thing that is owned from abuse by the owner. For example, the federal Animal
Welfare Act requires minimum standards of care and treatment for certain animals
bred for commercial sale or transported commercially.3 15 At the state level,
anticruelty laws protect privately owned animals against cruelty and neglect; the
majority of states even provide for the seizure of animals that are being
mistreated.3 16
Other laws, though not as obvious in their delivery, also protect elements of
nature from abuse by their owners. At the federal level, the Endangered Species
Act protects certain listed species and their habitat from harm even if they exist on
private lands.317 The ESA prohibits all people, whether private landowners or
314 For example, mining laws like the General Mining Law of 1872 govern individual
rights to locate and acquire mineral rights; the law is focused on resolving competing
claims between individuals or between individuals and the government. 30 U.S.C. § 22
(2006) (giving "free and open" rights to exploration and purchase of hard rock minerals);
id. § 28 (explaining how claims are located and recorded so as to protect against competing
claims); see also GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAw 558-84 (6th ed. 2007) (addressing disputes under the General Mining
Law). Similarly, the Taylor Grazing Act implements a regime for allocating private grazing
permits on public lands. 43 U.S.C § 315 (2006) (setting forth the purpose of the Act as
promoting the highest use of public lands); Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728,
728, 733-36 (2000) (describing the Act as authorizing the Department of the Interior to
"divide the public rangelands into grazing districts" and grant permits to landowners
engaged in the livestock business). Water law doctrines like prior appropriation and
reasonable use resolve water allocation disputes between individual water users. See
COGGINS ET AL., supra at 486-88 (providing a brief overview of the prior appropriation and
reasonable use doctrines). Even frequently invoked common law doctrines in the area of
natural resources, like nuisance, are aimed at resolving disputes between individual
landowners. See, e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors in and for Kossuth Cnty., 584
N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1998) (landowner challenge to county decision to designate certain
land as an "agricultural area," making Confined Area Feeding Operations (CAFOs)
immune from nuisance suits). In each of these examples, natural resource laws decide
which landowner, speculator, or right holder is entitled to use nature; they do not
necessarily guarantee nature itself will be protected from overuse.
315 See generally Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006) (for the text of
the act including the policy behind the law, definitions, and statutory requirements).
316 See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5
ANIMAL L. 69, 71 n.13 (1999) (listing State statutes "providing for the seizure of animals
being cruelly treated or neglected").
" 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(8) (2006).
1952012]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
commercial businesses, from taking listed endangered and threatened species.
Under some circumstances, this taking prohibition can also protect against habitat
modification.319 Some state endangered species acts contain similar protections.320
Even nonwildlife elements of nature receive some protection from misuse
under various federal, state, and common laws. Wetlands are protected by section
404 of the Clean Water Act.3 2 1 Instream water flows-which provide benefits such
as flood mitigation, groundwater recharge, biological productivity, and recreational
opportunities-are also often protected. For example, Washington State enacted a
Water Resources Act that requires rivers and streams within the state to "be
retained with base flows necessary to provide for preservation of wildlife, fish,
scenic, aesthetic and other environmental values, and navigational values." 322
Likewise, under the Washington Water Code, permits for water use rights are
conditioned upon the protection of instream flows. 3 23
As a final example of current efforts to protect nature from misuse by its
owners, farm programs like the Conservation Reserve Program expressly limit
farm practices that cause soil erosion as a condition of government funding.324 In
particular, the program provides that program participants must "[e]stablish and
maintain the required vegetative or water cover and the required practices on the
land . . . to achieve the desired environmental benefits and to maintain the
productive capability of the soil .. .,325
Though present, these examples are limited to narrow instances, as when a
species is in danger of extinction or when a landowner voluntarily signs up for a
conservation program. To protect ecosystem services, these specific rules need to
be expanded to a more generalized prohibition against misuse of nature. This
scheme would not be intended to replace existing common law or statutory
remedies, but rather work in tandem with them to more appropriately protect
ecosystem services instead of just selected parts of the patchwork.
For natural resource damages to serve as a realistic foundation for developing
a comprehensive framework for remedying misuses of nature, it must protect
nature while respecting the right of private property owners to use those resources
311 Id. § 1538(a).
319 See supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
320 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-2-105(3), (4) (2011) (prohibiting any person
from taking endangered or threatened species); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1 to /Il
(West 2004) (prohibiting any person from taking listed species); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
84.0895 (West 2004) (protecting threatened and endangered species).
321 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (2006).
322 Water Resources Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(3)(a) (West
2004).
323 Washington Water Code, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.03.247 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2011).
324 7 C.F.R. § 1410.20(a) (2011) (setting forth the participant's obligations and
requiring practices that reduce soil erosion as a condition of participation).32 5 Id. § 1410.20(a)(6).
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in legitimate ways. It must also accurately incorporate evolving scientific
understanding and reflect the realities of the land itself. In particular, there are at
least eight key issues that a new natural resources damages framework will have to
resolve:
(1) Accommodating the Uniqueness ofLand
There are natural variations among landscapes, with different lands
embodying varying levels of resilience to similar uses. What is sustainable or
acceptable land use in one area might not be sustainable in the other. A reformed
natural resource damages law should recognize those differences and avoid land
use restrictions simply because certain practices are detrimental to substantially
different types of land. Professor Freyfogle has made a similar point in suggesting
that a new, ecological approach to landownership should tailor private rights "to
take into account the natural variations among land parcels." 326
Incorporating a scientifically based understanding of the landscape would be
useful in this regard. For example, ecoregions might prove a useful tool for
building a catalog of unacceptable land use practices for various ecotypes.
Ecoregions
denote areas of general similarity in ecosystems and in the type, quality,
and quantity of environmental resources. They are designed to serve as a
spatial framework for the research, assessment, management, and
monitoring of ecosystems and ecosystem components. By recognizing
the spatial differences in the capacities and potentials of ecosystems,
ecoregions stratify the environment by its probable response to
disturbance.327
The difficulty in applying science (such as knowledge of ecoregions) will be in
providing enough differentiation to accommodate lands' unique character, and yet
enough bright line rules to provide property owners with clarity as to what
legitimate uses of property include. Only by providing such clarity do we preserve
the stability of property rights. It is also worth recognizing that this challenge of
matching acceptable land use and resource management with varying types of land
is made even more difficult in the face of climate change, where weather patterns
326 FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 229; see also Freyfogle, Particulars of Owning,
supra note 21, at 585 ("Slowly, painfully, people are coming to think that landowner rights
should somehow depend on the natural features of the parcel owned.").
327 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Ecoregions of Oklahoma, W. ECOLOGY DivisION,
http://www.epa.gov/wed/pages/ecoregions/ok-eco.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2011).
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will inevitably alter the landscape and call into question whether uses once deemed
sustainable can still qualify as such.328
(2) Drawing the Line between Use and Misuse
Not all land use and natural resource consumption is bad or unacceptable.32 9
Consumption is necessary for survival. As a result, because we cannot simply set
land aside and preserve it in perpetuity, a reformed natural resource damages law
will have to undertake the challenge of identifying workable rules that balance use
against misuse. Naturally, such line drawing will have to accommodate our
constantly evolving understanding of ecology. Moreover, because line drawing is a
reflection of values in one capacity or another, balancing use against misuse should
be rooted in a well-defined and articulated ethical framework.
(3) Creating a New Cause ofAction
A central task in shaping a reformed natural resource damages law will be the
creation of a new cause of action setting forth the elements of proof. This cause of
action will need to be flexible enough to accommodate the uniqueness of land, the
ever-changing ecological understanding, and the many types of resource use that
this law would ideally protect. On the other hand, the cause of action must not
permit so much flexibility that it lacks clarity, for in issues dealing with private
property, clarity provides stability. 3 30 Additionally, determining how this cause of
action will intersect with existing state property, tort, and natural resource laws
will also need to be worked out.
In striking this balance between flexibility and predictability, select elements
of the common law of nuisance and current natural resource damages law are
important. Nuisance law is a model of simplicity and flexibility, providing a
remedy for injuries ranging from interstate disputes over air pollution3 3 1 to private
property disputes over the location of cattle-feeding operations. 33 2 Federal natural
resource damages law, on the other hand, prescribes a framework that is more
consciously tailored to some of the unique characteristics of ecological injury. For
example, natural resource damages law recognizes the public trust component of
328 See, e.g., Gary W. Yohe et al., Perspectives on Climate Change and Sustainability,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION
OF WORKING GROUP 11 TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 811-41 (Martin L. Parry et al. eds.,
2007) ("Climate change adds to the list of stressors that challenge our ability to achieve the
ecologic, economic and social objectives that define sustainable development.").
329 See discussion supra Part I.
330 See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 7, at 87 (2007) ("For private property to produce
its many possible benefits landowners need protection for at least certain expectations.").
33 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907).
332 Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 701 (Ariz. 1972).
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natural resources and accordingly permits only designated federal, state, and tribal
trustees to pursue natural resource damages.3 33 Moreover, natural resource
damages law also tailors causal elements to accommodate the difficulty in proving
causation for ecological injuries.334
In the end, the new cause of action will likely be a unique blend of elements
borrowed from traditional causes of action and ones that have yet to be devised.
Along these lines, Professor Bill Rodgers suggests the creation of a "new tort of
contamination," which he would define as the "interference with the use and
enjoyment of ecosystem functions."33 5 In his loose sketch of what this new tort
might look like, Rodgers proposes "a strict liability tort with elements being (1)
contamination, (2) causation, and (3) prospects of remediation." 336 In this regard,
Professor Rodgers seems to start with common law of nuisance and weave in
elements of current natural resource damages law. Though the details are left for
another day, what is important at this point is the recognition that a legal tool is
missing from the environmental protection toolbox. As Professor Rodgers aptly
observed:
Contamination of natural capital-decline in the baseline-might be
explained on the grounds of ownership failure. The commons may lack
the vigorous champion of private entitlement. But the fish, the drinking
water, the shellfish beds, and the body burdens do not appear to lack
necessary plaintiffs. What is missing is a legal tool to correct the
situation.
(4) Proving Causation for Ecological Injuries
Although there are many possible forms that a new cause of action for natural
resource damages might take, proving causation is sure to be one of the central
elements. Because proving causation for ecological injuries is not an easy task, it
deserves separate consideration.
Ecological injuries are characterized by five defining characteristics-
complexity, scientific uncertainty, dynamism, precaution, and controversy. 8
Because of these characteristics, ecological injuries give rise to difficult problems
in identifying the extent and duration of harm, in proving causal relationships
between manifested harm and the allegedly environmentally detrimental act, and in
providing such identification and proof within the time frame usually required
3 See supra Part I.B.
334 See infra notes 338-347 and accompanying text.
3 Rodgers, supra note 11, at 1259.
336 id
33 Id. at 1257.
338 LAZARUS, supra note 304, at 16.
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from response plans and redress paradigms. 3 39 A reformed natural resource
damages law will have to overcome these obstacles in identifying ecological injury
and proving causation for those injuries.
In his call for a "tort of contamination," 340 Professor Rodgers offered
CERLCA as an example of an environmental statute that incorporates a
nontraditional causation standard.34 1 CERCLA is a strict liability scheme that
imposes joint and several liability on parties found to be responsible for
contaminating a site. 34 2 But because CERCLA defines responsibility broadly, a
plaintiff does not have to show that a defendant actually caused the release that
resulted in the incurrence of response costs. 34 3 Rather than employing a traditional
causation test that requires tracing the alleged harm to a particular actor or set of
actors, CERCLA adopts a more flexible standard that simply requires that the
release was "likely to have been a causative factor" giving rise to the alleged
harm.34 4 Thus, once the plaintiff has proven that the defendant is a potentially
responsible party (PRP), a rebuttable presumption of liability arises, and the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant, who then may assert an affirmative defense
by disproving causation.34
By eliminating traditional tort causation from the plaintiffs prima facie case,
the CERLCA standard recognizes that harms to nature can rarely be proven as a
straight-line correlation between action and reaction.34 6 Whether under this test or
339 See Knudsen, supra note 304, at 99.
340 Rodgers, supra note 11, at 1259.
341 id
342 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006) (CERCLA provision on liability); Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878-81 (2009).
343 Steve C. Gold, Dis-Jointed? Several Approaches to Divisibility After Burlington
Northern, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 307, 328 n.126 (2009) (citing to several cases where courts
have recognized CERCLA's truncated causation requirement).
34 Rodgers, supra note 11, at 1259 (citing 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTE & SUBSTANCES § 8.11, at 660-66 (West
1992)); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.
1993); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Ascon
Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1989)); Patricia E. Lin &
Tom Starnes, Establishing Liability Under CERCLA: The Causal Nexus and the
Alternative Liability Theory 1 (June 5, 2000), available at http://www.andrewskurth.com/
assets/pdflarticle 48.pdf (noting that under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006), a plaintiff must
prove only (1) that there has been a release or threatened release covered by CERCLA, (2)
that the plaintiff has incurred response costs, (3) that the response costs were necessary and
consistent with the national contingency plan, and (4) that the defendant is a PRP
(potentially responsible party) as defined by CERCLA).
345 See Amoco, 889 F.2d at 668; United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170-71
(4th Cir. 1988).
346 See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L.
REv. 1493, 1506-08, 1511 n.86 (1994). To prove causation under traditional tort law, a
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a different one, the new natural resource damages scheme would similarly benefit
from recognizing the unique character of environmental harm and tailor the
causation standard accordingly. 34 7
(5) Addressing the Likely Aggregate Nature of Harm
Ecosystems cross ownership boundaries. 34 8  And ecological harms,
particularly those stemming from land use and natural resource consumption, often
result from compounding stresses to the land.349 Many landowners might,
therefore, cause harm to nature through collective, if uncoordinated, action.350
For the purposes of reforming natural resource damages law, the aggregate
nature of some ecological harm makes determination of liability difficult but
essential. If harm is caused by several actors who are not necessarily operating in
concert, who should be held accountable? One could, for instance, choose to hold
accountable the last actor who stresses the resource beyond its natural capacity for
alteration. This would make it incumbent on any actor to consider the likely
cumulative impact of his or her proposed actions on the ecosystem. If that action
would trigger an unacceptably negative ecological response, the actor would be
held accountable for resulting injuries, notwithstanding the fact that the injury may
have been the product of several collective actions. NEPA imposes similar
requirements on federal agencies to consider the cumulative impacts of their
proposed actions before deciding on an alternative. 3 5 1 Last-in-time liability seems
to be a rather simple system for assessing liability, assuming one could identify
which actor was last in time. But what if the last actor is the one whose land use
provides the greatest utility to the community? Should that actor be prohibited
plaintiff would have to trace particular molecules of contamination back to the defendant,
who maiy have deposited the materials at the release site decades ago.
347 It is important to note that the relaxed test for causation under CERCLA applies
only to actions seeking recovery for response costs. For natural resource damages,
CERLCA requires a causal link between the responsible party and the injury to the
resource. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.62 (2011) (providing a procedure for establishing causation
for water resources, geological resources, and biological resources injury). This regulation
was upheld in Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 468-73 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
To demonstrate injury and causation, the resource must be characterized, samples collected
and statistically compared to measure injury, and the discharge modeled through various
possible pathways. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.61 (2011).
348 See supra Part I.B.1.
349 See, e.g., Wayne R. Munns, Jr., Assessing Risks to Wildlife Populations from
Multiple Stressors: Overview of the Problem and Research, 11 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y, 2006,
available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll1/issl/art23/.
350 See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of aggregate harm and the tragedy of
fragmentation.
3 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.25(c) (2011).
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from taking action simply because others have collectively made inefficient or
reckless resource decisions in the past?
Another option for assessing liability would be holding all contributing actors
jointly and severally liable for injuries caused by their aggregate activities. Such a
system could look to CERCLA's model of assessing joint and several liability in
the environmental contamination context.352 However, the injuries targeted by
CERLCA are more focused than the more comprehensive set of harms that
reformed natural resource damages law would be designed to address. CERLCA
deals with injuries arising from releases of toxic substances. 3 53 And although such
releases might be an inevitable byproduct of industrial activities, most people
would probably agree that all toxic releases are undesirable and should be
avoidable given enough care or incentive. In that sense, holding all contributing
actors jointly and severally liable for toxic releases does not offend the equitable
senses. But injuries arising from resource use generally-aggregate resource use in
particular-are not so easily judged. From an equity standpoint, not everyone who
contributes to the aggregate harm had equal reason to foresee that use of a given
resource would unacceptably stress the ecosystem. Why then should all actors be
held joint and severally liable? Moreover, what if all of the actors cannot be
identified because of the multiple and complex pathways in which ecological harm
can manifest?
The area of wildlife management provides a general example of a situation in
which multiple stressors contribute to ecological harm. Wildlife population
declines can result from the combination of many negative ecological stressors
including "alteration of habitat caused by patterns of agricultural and urban land
use, introduced invasive and exotic species, nutrient enrichment, direct human
disturbance, and toxic chemicals."354 The presence of multiple stressors
complicates the ability of wildlife managers to identify which policy changes
would most effectively curtail the population decline. 3 55
A similar situation is one where there is a single stressor from multiple
sources, unwittingly joining forces to overcome an ecosystem's natural
assimilative capacity. Climate change is one prominent area where the issue of
liability for collective harms proves exceptionally difficult and important. Because
the Earth's natural systems are capable of assimilating some amounts of
352 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006) (the civil liability provision of CERCLA). While
the final version of CERLCA deleted explicit references to joint and several liability, courts
have held that potentially responsible party liability is joint and several if no basis exists for
dividing the harm of the contamination and the response costs. See Steven Ferrey,
Converting Brownfield Environmental Negatives into Energy Positives, 34 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 417, 460-64 (2007) (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672
(5th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1988)).
3 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (for instance, § 9601(14) defines hazardous
substances broadly).
354 Munns, supra note 349, at 1.
355 Id.
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greenhouse gases without identifiable disruption, one actor emitting carbon dioxide
into the atmosphere causes no discernible injury. But multiple actors responding to
our combined unyielding thirst for development, industrialization, and
consumption has stressed the earth's natural systems beyond capacity.356 This
stress has manifested in very real and identifiable injuries. Given the collective
actions contributing to this stress, can any single actor or category of actors be held
accountable?
There have only been a handful of climate change litigation cases framed as
common law nuisance actions.357 In general, those actions have sought to impose
property damage or personal injury liability on sources of greenhouse gas
emissions for failing to properly mitigate climate change. Most notably, in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. 358 plaintiffs invoked the common law
public nuisance doctrine to file a lawsuit against six electric power companies for
contributing to global warming.359  Together, the defendants operated
approximately 174 fossil fuel-fired power plants in twenty states that allegedly
constituted ten percent of all carbon dioxide emissions in the United States. 360 The
federal district court dismissed the lawsuit on political question grounds.361 On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and allowed the public nuisance claim to
proceed.362 In particular, the Court suggested that joint and several liability is
363
appropriate in the climate change context. To that end, in the course of
addressing whether plaintiffs satisfied the redressability element of standing, the
court noted that in federal common law of nuisance cases involving air pollution,
"ambient air contains pollution from multiple sources" and "liability is joint and
several."3 64 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Clean Air Act
has displaced federal common law of nuisance in the area of greenhouse gas
emissions.3 65 The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that climate
nuisance litigation could be viable under a state common law of nuisance theory.3 6 6
Scholars have begun to tackle this issue as well. Professor David Grossman
has examined joint and several liability in the global warming context and has
concluded that "one could reasonably argue that it is possible to identify
356 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
3 David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation in
the United States, [2010] 40 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,644, 10,647.
31' 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated and remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d
Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
359 Id. at 267.
360 Id. at 268.
361 Id. at 274.
362 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131
S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
3631 Id. at 328, 349.
6 Id. at 349.
365 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
366 Id. at 2540.
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defendants who have contributed substantially to climate change and its resulting
effects."3 67 Given equity concerns of holding a few actors liable for harm as
cumulative and disperse as climate change, Grossman suggests, "apportioning
damages (appropriately reduced to account for past emissions) based on a
combination of defendants' market-shares and the greenhouse gas emissions of
their products."368
As additional cases and scholarship develop in the context of climate change
litigation, fresh perspectives on imposing liability for ecological injuries from
aggregate and disperse activities might also prove useful in developing a new
natural resource damages law.
(6) Choosing Appropriate Plaintiffs
Part of creating a new cause of action is deciding who might be appropriate to
bring claims for harms to nature. Given the public nature of the resources at issue,
the plaintiffs raising such claims would be acting in the public interest and must
therefore be selected with that important caveat in mind.6
A ready-made solution would be to follow the current natural resource
damages law that permits only federal, state, or tribal trustees to initiate claims for
natural resource damages. While such a limitation might ensure that the public
interest is served, current natural resource damages law has demonstrated that
reliance on select trustees to litigate natural resource injuries can stifle the
effectiveness of the remedy. 370 Relying on designated trustees to identify and
pursue remedies for harms to nature would be like relying on federal agencies
alone to enforce all environmental statutes without the benefit of citizen suit
367 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 1, 28 (2003).
361 Id. at 32-33. Professor J.B. Ruhl described this liability conundrum in the context
of enforcing the Endangered Species Act's take prohibition for harms caused by climate
change impacts. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building
Bridges to the No Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1, 40-42 (2008); see also James R.
Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About
Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat
Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 618-23, 628-30 (2003) (criticizing the approach of
prosecuting only major contributors for takings violations in the western water diversion
context, another area in which there are several and dispersed causal agents giving rise to
harm).
369 In his discussion of a new "tort of contamination," Rodgers similarly observed that
"the tort of contamination protects public interests, and appropriate plaintiffs should be
selected with that goal in mind." Rodgers, supra note 11, at 1260.
370 See supra Part II.B.
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provisions. Perhaps this is why citizen suits have played a central role in the
enforcement, clarification, and effectiveness of environmental statutes.
Just as citizen suit provisions in many environmental statutes have increased
the enforcement and effectiveness of environmental regulations, such provisions
might also be instrumental in effectively remedying harms to nature. Given the
goal of serving the public interest, a modified citizen suit provision might be
considered; rather than permitting "any person" to assert a claim for harms to
nature, a modified citizen suit provision could limit plaintiffs to designated public
trustees as well as public interest organizations who are able to make a nominal
showing of competency and experience in litigating environmental issues. And,
similar to the sixty-day notice requirement contained in most environmental citizen
suit provisions,372 a modified citizen suit provision for the new natural resource
damages law could require notice to public trustees. In this way, trustees, like
federal or state agencies, could elect to pursue certain claims of harm deemed
particularly sensitive or important to the public trust resources. Other attributes of
a modified citizen suit provision might include the right to intervene in cases
brought by public trustees upon showing of standing and good cause, or limits to
public participation in cases seeking criminal penalties.
In general, the key to selecting appropriate plaintiffs would be affording
public access to the courts without sacrificing competent and genuine pursuit of the
public interest.
(7) Defining Scope ofAppropriate Remedies
It goes without saying that any scheme providing a remedy for the misuse of
nature will have to decide what remedies are appropriate once liability is
established. Many environmental statutes contain provisions allowing civil
penalties, criminal penalties, and injunctive relief.3 73 In light of these examples of
penalty provisions, one might be most easily inclined toward providing a similar
suite of remedies in the new natural resource damages law. One could also choose
to borrow from existing natural resource damages statutes, adopting CERCLA and
OPA's requirement that monies recovered be put towards restoration.374
371 See Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses Against Them, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION 1079 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, June 27-30, 2007).
372 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2) (2006) (Endangered Species Act's sixty day
notice requirement); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2006) (Clean Water Act's sixty day notice
requirement); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006) (Clean Air Act's sixty day notice requirement).
37 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §
136 (2006); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2006); Clean Water Act §
1319(d); Clean Air Act § 7413.
374 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2006).
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The type of remedies that are ultimately deemed appropriate under this
reformed natural resources damage law depends in large part on the goal of the law
itself. Professor Rodgers argues, for example, that a "tort of contamination" should
strive to restore and rehabilitate. 375 Similarly, the goal of a reformed natural
resource damages law might be restoration to the extent conceivable. If the goal is
to restore, then penalties would not necessarily be appropriate, unless they are
376
required to be put toward restoration. On the other hand, if the goal is merely to
punish wrongful acts, then we might view the question of traditional penalties
differently and encourage penalties and criminalization.
Given how difficult recreating nature's services can be,377 a suite of remedies
that maximally deter misuse in the first instance would seem necessary and
appropriate. At the same time, the remedies should ensure that once the damage is
done, the effectiveness and efficiency of restoration efforts are maximized. Simply
borrowing from current natural resource damages law on that issue would not be
wise, as the federal natural resource damages process needs to be revised in order
make restoration of natural resources "faster, more efficient, and more
effective."378 Given that current natural resource damages law struggles to achieve
effectiveness and efficiency of restoration, 3 79 a better solution must be designed for
a new scheme.
(8) Measuring Natural Resource Damages
Related to the issue of appropriate remedies is the narrower issue of how to
value resource damages. Though relatively narrow, valuation is not a simple
inquiry. Rather, it is one of the most hotly contested issues in natural resource
damage claims.3 so One approach suggests measuring the use and existence value of
375 Rodgers, supra note 11, at 1260.
376 Id. ("The history of monetary compensation for loss of sustainable resources is not
a happy one. These 'cash-outs' can create momentary winners but with a poor distribution
and sadly skewed (and sometimes opportunistic) calculation of what has been lost.").
37 See discussion of the biosphere supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
378 See NAT. RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION FED. ADVISORY
COMM., supra note 312, at 4. The Federal Advisory Committee's recommendations were
aimed, in part, at establishing cooperative relationships with potentially responsible parties
in order to: (1) encourage responsible parties to fund damage assessments in the first
instance; and (2) avoid valuation issues by encouraging responsible parties to conduct the
restoration activities. Id. at 13. Until natural resource damage processes and methodologies
can be revised to facilitate effective recovery of public costs to natural resources, they will
most likely continue to be underutilized and met with success only in unusual cases.
"' Id. at 1.
380 See, e.g., Kanner & Nagy, supra note 313, at 488 (citing Stewart, supra note 313,
at 163) ("[M]easuring natural resource damages is 'the most daunting task facing
trustees."'); Nicoll, supra note 313, at 464 (challenging traditional economic theory in the
valuation of natural resources); Thompson, supra note 312, at 60 ("Natural resource
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the resource from a utilitarian perspective, namely the worth of the resource
measured by its value to individuals or society. 38 1 Another approach-the
biocentric approach-would measure the intrinsic value of the resource
independent of human satisfactions.3 82 Not surprisingly, the preferred method of
valuing natural resources is to quantify utilitarian values of use and existence
through some method of cost-benefit analysis. 3 3 Three of the most common
methods for measuring the value of natural resource damages are market valuation,
restoration or replacement cost, and contingent valuation.384 Market valuation uses
definable markets to measure the worth of a resource. 385 Restoration or
replacement costs, as the name implies, measure the resource's worth by asking
how much it would cost to restore the damage.386 Given that restoration projects
can be labor intensive and complicated, these costs can greatly exceed market
valuation.3 87 Contingent valuation is a controversial method by which value is
measured by surveying members of the public to assess how much they would be
willing to pay to replace or restore the resource. 388 Regardless of the chosen
method, however, there are certain to be controversies given that natural resource
damages are unique in many instances and their uses not readily subject to
valuation.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article continues the work of scholars who have urged a mended view of
private property and others who have described the failings of environmental laws
to protect ecosystems as interconnected wholes. Joining the existing dialogue, this
Article tackles the uncomfortable and controversial issues of ethical obligations,
private property rights, and public ownership: It describes the shared responsibility
to avoid the misuse of nature, finding support for this responsibility in literature,
religion, culture, science, and law.389 It explains how the study of ecology has led
to more mature views on nature-views that recognize the utility of nature when
allowed to function as an interconnected whole. 390 It surveys the scholarship that
calls for a similarly mature understanding property-an understanding that
damages present a significant challenge for the legal system because in most cases they are
non-market commodities.").
381 See Peck, supra note 156, at 279-86.
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 Id. at 279-85.
38. Id. at 282-83.
6Id. at 283-84.
387 id.
388 Id. at 284-85; see also supra note 276 and accompanying text.
389 See supra Part I.B. 1.
390 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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recognizes the legitimate role of public interest in property law.39' Finally, it
highlights how the multitude of environmental laws currently in effect do not
protect nature as an interconnected whole.3 9 2
By bringing these conservations into the same space, this Article sets the stage
for a broader vision of natural resource law reform and picks up where others have
left off. Turning to natural resource damages law as a touchstone for reform, this
Article suggests that the bedrock principles underlying natural damages law are a
promising foundation for a reformed legal system that respects broader public
interests in how nature is altered and provides a remedy for misuse. The aim of the
reformed law is necessarily broad, concerned with misuses of nature on public and
private lands alike, as well as misuses that arise from multiple stressors. Though
the details of what the reformed law would look like and how it would operate are
necessarily left for another day, the challenges enumerated are fundamental
considerations for any comprehensive law that seeks to protect ecosystem health
across ownership boundaries.
391 See supra Part I.B.2.
392 See supra Part II.
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